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S. . [O]ur market system depends critically on trust-trust in the
word of our colleagues and trust in the word of those with whom we do
business.
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan'
I. INTRODUCTION
Confronted with allegations of either wrongdoing or
incompetence, many business corporations are facing crises of social
legitimacy and the loss of public trust. For some, it is already too late.
As we write this Article, revelations over the misleading accounting
practices of Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and others have
destroyed jobs and shareholder value. Such fraud and other instances
of malfeasance have destroyed Arthur Andersen, exacerbated an
economic recession, and provoked an almost unprecedented market
downturn. In his July 2002, presentation to Congress, partially quoted
1. Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Policy Report for 2002: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 44 (2002) (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve).
Well-functioning markets require accurate information to allocate capital and other
resources, and market participants must have confidence that our predominately
voluntary system of exchange is transparent and fair. Although business transactions
are governed by laws and contracts, if even a modest fraction of those transactions
had to be adjudicated, our courts would be swamped into immobility. Thus, our
market system depends critically on trust-trust in the word of our colleagues and
trust in the word of those with whom we do business. Falsification and fraud are
highly destructive to free-market capitalism and, more broadly, to the underpinnings
of our society .... Lawyers, internal and external auditors, corporate boards, Wall
Street security analysts, rating agencies, and large institutional holders of stock all
failed for one reason or another to detect and blow the whistle on those who breached
the level of trust essential to well-functioning markets.
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above, Alan Greenspan succinctly described the root cause of the
broader unfolding problem-a lack of trust.
2
Public trust is the essential ingredient lost by those companies
and currently by the market system as a whole. Policymakers are
now wrestling with the appropriate restructuring of the regulatory
institutions designed to generate trust in publicly traded
corporations, 3 and groups such as the American Bar Association 4 and
the New York Stock Exchange5 are examining how to reestablish trust
in "corporate governance," a term previously foreign to the common
vocabulary.
6
Although the problem of public trust is particularly salient
today for publicly traded business corporations, all organizations, both
public and private, may face social legitimacy crises. A single damning
allegation, whether true or false, has the potential to undermine
seriously, or even to destroy, a business, charity, government office,
school, congregation, community, or any other organization that
requires the public's trust. That fate may be well deserved in some
instances, but in others it may be unfair to the organization. In either
case, most of the individuals and constituents within the beleaguered
organization are innocent and suffer without cause. Nevertheless, the
voracious appetite of the news media for possible wrongdoing, its role
in forming public opinion, and its technological capacity to
2. See generally id.
3. Most notable is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
For a discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Whom Does It Affect and How?, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 2002, at 3. For an
example of emerging state legislation, see S.B. 1452, 2001-01 Sen., 2001-02 Sess. (Cal. 2002)
(pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgibin/-
postquery?bill-number=sb_1452&sess=PREV&house=B&site=sen (last visited Mar. 14, 2002);
California Senate Committee Passes Enron Reform Bill: Whistleblower Legislation Protects
Dissenting Voices, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 23, 2002, 2002 WL 4577870 (describing Cal. S.B. 1452);
see also Legislation and Regulations Spurred by Enron, KIPLINGER LETTER (Kiplinger), Mar. 22,
2002, 2002 WL 20621797 (discussing Enron's impact on policymakers and businesses).
4. The American Bar Association assembled the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility to
focus on core issues of corporate governance, including the role of lawyers "in creating an
environment designed to assure corporate integrity and responsibility." Task Force to Probe
Enron Debacle, ABA J. E-REP., Apr. 26, 2002 (quoting Robert E. Hirshon, ABA President). The
ABA task force presented its findings to its House of Delegates in August 2002. Id.
5. The New York Stock Exchange assembled the Corporate Accountability and Listing
Standards Committee to review matters involving corporate governance, noting that "[it is
imperative that we reinforce trust and confidence in our publicly traded companies and in our
markets." Press Release, N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Appoints Special Board Committee to Advise
on Corporate Governance (Feb. 13, 2002) (quoting NYSE Chairman and CEO Dick Grasso),
available at http://www.nyse.com/press/NT00072CAE.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
6. Corporate governance refers to the relationship between the shareholders, directors,




disseminate information widely and instantaneously can cause an
immediate and irreparable loss of trust if the organization is not
prepared to respond quickly and decisively to end the social legitimacy
crisis and to regain the public's trust.
In the current environment, traditional methods of
organizational response to allegations of wrongdoing and
incompetence are proving less effective. Some organizations are
responding by hiring well-known public figures with reputations for
integrity to conduct internal investigations and report their findings
to the public-a process we refer to as "public independent fact-
finding" ("PIFF").
In this Article focusing on trusted entities and individual
lawyers as fact finders, we describe the vital role that trust,
reputation, and social legitimacy play in the health of organizations.
Using business corporations as our primary example, we explore the
phenomena of corporate legitimacy crises and traditional responses,
apologia. We examine factors present in the current environment that
undermine the effectiveness of both corporate apologia and other
trust-generating institutions. We turn our attention to PIFF as an
alternative trust-generating process, distinguish it from other forms of
fact-finding, and consider the benefits and inherent problems of
attempting to institutionalize the process better. Focusing on lawyers
as fact finders and the American Arbitration Association's new
Independent Fact-Finding Service ("IFFS"), we analyze the procedural
and ethical issues associated with possible institutionalization models.
Although many recommendations for rebuilding public trust
will be made by task forces and the inevitable scores of law review
articles spawned in the wake of Enron, 7 we conclude that fact-finding
7. See, e.g., Michelle Chan-Fisher, After Enron: How Accounting and SEC Reform Can
Promote Corporate Accountability While Restoring Public Confidence, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,965
(Aug. 2002); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: Professional Responsibility
Issues, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 841 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. B-1315, 2002); William F. Dietrich, Legal and Ethical Issues for Attorneys
Dealing with Financial Data: Heightened Scrutiny After the Enron and Andersen Debacle, in
BASICS OF ACCOUNTING & FINANCE: WHAT EVERY PRACTICING LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW 925 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1325, 2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What
Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002); Kevin P. Kennedy & Deanna Chechile, Waiting for
Enforcement: How to Manage Risks for the Audit Committee in the Post-Enron World, in
SECURITIES LAW & THE INTERNET 2002: DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN LIGHT OF ENRON & CURRENT
SEC DISCLOSURE INITIATIVES 641 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. BO-
01BB, 2002); Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or
Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101 (2002); Marissa P. Viccaro, Can Regulation Fair
Disclosure Survive the Aftermath of Enron?, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 695 (2002) (discussing the
effectiveness of Regulation Fair Disclosure after Enron).
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conducted with the public trust in mind can provide institutions with
a more effective response to social legitimacy crises.
II. TRUST, REPUTATION, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL LEGITIMACY
To better understand the contextual problem of public trust, we
start by exploring three interrelated concepts-trust, particularly in
the public sphere, reputation, and social legitimacy as applied to
juristic, as opposed to natural, persons. These concepts have attracted
the attention of scholars from a variety of disciplines,8 including law,9
and are useful in examining the nature of the problem and
appropriate responses to it.
A. Trust and Cooperation
Trust has emotional, behavioral, and cognitive components and
many definitions, most of which recognize a situation in which there
are at least two actors, one of whom is vulnerable to the other. 10 Trust
8. See, e.g., CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE
IMAGE (1996) (applying reputation analysis to marketing); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE
SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995) (using economic theory to analyze
trust); JACK R. GIBB, TRUST: A NEW VIEW OF PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(1978) (examining trust in the context of group relations and organizational behavior); NIKLAS
LUHMANN, Trust: A Mechanism For the Reduction of Social Complexity, in TRUST AND POWER:
TWO WORKS BY NIKLAS LUHMANN 1 (1979) (discussing trust in the context of sociology);
JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1996) (discussing the
importance of reputation in international relations); REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY
ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT (Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997) (discussing reputation in the context
of economics and cognitive studies); PETER SHELDON GREEN, REPUTATION RISK MANAGEMENT
(1992) (discussing public relations as a means to protect a firm's reputation and manage risk);
PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1999) (examining trust within political
sociology); TRUST AND GOVERNANCE (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998)
(considering trust from a political science perspective); TRUST AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Fran Tonkiss
et al. eds., St. Martin's Press, 2000) (examining trust from the perspective of various social
sciences); TRUST AND ECONOMIC LEARNING (Nathalie Lazaric & Edward Lorenz eds., 1998)
(discussing trust and business ethics); Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A
Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393, 394 (1998) (finding common elements
of trust as viewed among various disciplines).
9. See, e.g., Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 523 (2001) (examining trust in traditional commerce and trust in Internet commerce);
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) (discussing trust in the corporate setting and
corporate law); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002) (analyzing
the role of trust in health care law); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 553 (2001)
(analyzing various forms of trust and the conflict between trust and law).
10. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 97-98 (1990)
(maintaining that trust has four components: First, trust allows actions that otherwise are not
possible; second, if the trusted person (trustee) is trustworthy, then the trustor will be better off
than if he had not trusted, but if the trustee is not trustworthy, then the trustor will be worse off
2003] 1117
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or trustworthiness is a factor only if you know or believe that someone
else's behavior can affect you or that your behavior can affect the
behavior of another.11 Because trust involves the vulnerable person's
optimism about how the other will behave, it is largely a psychological
and emotional state.' 2 If A trusts B, A expects or believes that B will
behave in an other-regarding manner that will not exploit A's
vulnerability. In this sense, trust is an attitude concerning the
benevolent motivations and intentions of another more than a
prediction of positive results or outcomes.
13
Projected outcomes and degree of risk are not unimportant,
however. Predictability and control may be independent variables
influencing the degree of trust required along a continuum-the
greater the risk, the greater potential for trust or distrust. 4 Trust is
not necessary when you can calculate how others will act accurately-
the more accurate the calculation, the less trust required.' 5 Nor is it
necessary when you can monitor and control the other's behavior-the
more control, the less trust required. 6 It is impossible, however, to
calculate risk with complete certainty or control behavior totally;
therefore, some degree of trust is always required to bridge the gap.
Ultimately, trust is independent of risk, i.e., it can exist in the absence
of rational calculation and social control, while it might not exist even
when behavior is highly predictable or closely controlled.' 7 In this way,
trust differs from confidence and reliance, which also involve the
calculated prediction of risk and outcomes, and is dependent more on
the perceived intentions and motivations of the trusted party than on
results and outcomes.' 8
than if he had not trusted; third, trust is an action that involves the voluntary placement of
resources (physical, financial, intellectual, or temporal) at the disposal of the trustee with no real
commitment from the trustee; and, fourth, a time lag exists between the extension of trust and
the result of the trusting behavior); see D. Harrison McKnight & Norman L. Chervany, The
Meanings of Trust (MISRC Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 96-04, 1996) (attempting
to categorize various meanings of trust), available at http://www.misrc.umn.eduwpaper/wp96-
04.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
11. Rousseau et al., supra note 8, at 395 (describing interdependence as a necessary
condition of trust).
12. Id. at 394-95.
13. See John G. Holmes & John K. Rempel, Trust in Close Relationships, in CLOSE
RELATIONSHIPS 187, 202-03 (Clyde Hendrick ed., 1989) (discussing motivation in relationships).
14. Rousseau et al., supra note 8, at 395.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (regarding the Tylenol scare). The risk of
purchasing contaminated Tylenol was almost zero, but consumers distrusted the product until
Johnson & Johnson acted to reassure them.
18. See TRUDY GOVIER, SOCIAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 6 (1997) (comparing trust
in intimate relationships with trust in the context of social roles); ADAM SELIGMAN, THE
PROBLEM OF TRUST 14-30 (1997) (distinguishing trust from confidence and understanding trust
1118 [Vol. 56:1113
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Trust is essential to efficient cooperation. Cooperation allows
for the production of benefits exceeding those achievable by an
individual acting alone; however, cooperative behavior by one
individual usually confers benefits on another with the risk that the
recipient will fail to reciprocate. 19 If A cannot trust B to reciprocate,
then either A will not cooperate and will forfeit the potential benefits
or A will expend resources to monitor and control B to ensure B
reciprocates. Alternatively, A can spend resources to punish B for B's
failure to reciprocate. 20 The more A can trust B to reciprocate, the less
A must spend to ensure reciprocation or to punish B.2' One way
interpersonal or mutual trust develops between individuals is through
repeated interactions that allow the actors to generalize the
expectation of continued cooperative behavior in subsequent
interactions. 22  Distrust arises when behavioral expectations are
violated in one interaction so as to create a generalization to
subsequent interactions,23 giving the violator a reputation for being
untrustworthy. The strong emotive sense of betrayal when
experiencing a breach of trust together with the tendency of people to
be trustworthy in the absence of sanctions indicates an evolved
preference or taste for trust and trustworthiness.
24
as role fulfillment); Lawrence C. Becker, Trust as Noncognitive Security About Motives, 107
ETHICS 43, 54 (1996) (using the government as an example of trust depending on intentions and
motivations).
19. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (examining
broadly the concept of cooperation in social and biological contexts); Robert L. Trivers, The
Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35 (1971). This problem of inducing
beneficial cooperation when individuals have incentives to cheat, or not to cooperate, is at the
core of law and economics. See CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS ch. I (1984) (discussing the prisoner's dilemma, free-rider problem, and external
effects created).
20. GOETZ, supra note 19.
21. Trust increases the propensity for cooperation, but is not necessary for cooperation. See
id. at 182.
22. See generally LUHMANN, supra note 8. This social theorist stresses the trial-and-error
nature of the development of trust, suggesting that people began with a readiness to trust which
is then put to the test in transactions with others, where it is either confirmed or undermined by
their experience.
23. See Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure,
1840-1920, in 8 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 53, 59 (JAI Press, Inc., 1986) (noting
that generalizations sometimes occur after trust is breached). But see Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L.
Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic "Remedies" for Trust/Distrust, 4 ORG.
SCI. 367, 372 (1993) ("Even repeated violations of trust can be excused as personal quirks as long
as the violations are confined to a particular domain and are not interpreted as threatening to
'spill over' into other domains .... thus delimiting the perceived generalizability of the
violation.").
24. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 9 (summarizing this point). For an evolutionary
behavior explanation of the emotions surrounding trust and the emotional precommitment to act
20031 1119
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B. Trust-Generating Institutions in Impersonal Societies
Social trust is an extension of, or perhaps merely the aggregate
of, interpersonal trust.25 A society may develop a culture of trust if a
sufficient number of mutually trusting individuals is engaging in
microlevel interactions. 26 This social trust becomes a public good upon
which others draw to make transactions with strangers more
efficient.27 However, when the likelihood of repeat encounters is
significantly reduced, as is the case with one-shot encounters with
strangers, it is tempting to "cheat," i.e., to take advantage of the other
person's trust.28 In complex, more impersonal societies, the reduced
likelihood of repeat interactions and the individual's reduced ability
(or increased cost) to monitor or to punish strangers, requires other
ways to control cheating. Thus, social trust and trustworthy behavior
are reinforced by trust-generating institutions, including social norms
and other regulatory mechanisms buttressed by external, social
sanctions. 29 If functioning properly, these institutions make it less
risky to trust, either because they inhibit cheating (by increasing the
cost of cheating) or reward trustworthiness (by making it more
profitable not to cheat).
In this context, law is a trust-generating institution that can
serve to reinforce or to help produce trust. It can serve a regulatory
function by either mandating or prohibiting trust-related behaviors, or
it can serve a more hortatory function by expressing trust-promoting
ideals;30 however, it cannot eliminate the need for trust. The law's
trustworthy using game theory, see ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE
STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988).
25. Stephen Knack & Paul J. Zak, Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, and
Economic Development, SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=304640 (discussing the impact of public
policy on interpersonal trust levels).
26. ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 170
(1993).
27. See Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 ECON. J. 295, 295 (2001)
(comparing social, economic, and institutional environments with high trust levels to less
efficient environments with low trust levels).
28. See generally AXELROD, supra note 19.
29. See generally Zucker, supra note 23.
30. This aspect is the "expressive function" of the law in promoting social values, norms,
and mores. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943 (1995) (discussing the construction of social meanings found in laws); Richard H. McAdams,
An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) (arguing that law expresses
the underlying attitudes of communities and society); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000). For an excellent discussion of the tension between the regulatory
and expressive functions of the law in promoting trust in the medical setting, see Hall, supra
note 9.
1120 [Vol. 56:1113
2003] PUBLIC INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING 1121
regulatory function is simply inadequate to ensure trustworthy
behavior. First, the costs of enforcement are too great to police every
interaction. Second, too much regulation begets untrustworthiness.
One of the more curious aspects of trust is that trust reinforces
trustworthiness and distrust undermines trustworthiness. In other
words, people are more likely to be trustworthy when other people
trust them;31 the more external sanctions and restraints on individual
discretion signaling distrust, the less trustworthy the behavior. 32 This
relation has particular implications in the context of fiduciary and
asymmetric power relationships3 3 and implies that the regulatory
function of the law is limited in its ability to generate trust. Law's
hortatory function is not easily enforceable, its force lying only in the
actor's sensitivity to moral suasion. Therefore, even in the presence of
trust-generating institutions, trust remains a necessary ingredient in
social and economic cooperation.
34
31. Bestowing trust is a social cue to the trusted person as to how they should behave. Hall,
supra note 9, at 510. Thus, when someone makes clear that they trust another person, it gives
that person a reason to continue the trustworthy behavior. See P. Pettit, The Cunning of Trust,
24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 202, 204-08 (1995) (explaining interactive trust). By fulfilling a trust, one
exhibits prudence, virtue, or loyalty. See id. at 217. Therefore, people fulfill trust either because
they are in fact prudent, virtuous, or loyal, or because they are pretending to have these virtues
to secure the good opinion of others or to feel good about themselves. Id. at 212-17 (discussing
attitude-dependent goods in the context of trust-responsiveness).
32. This result is sometimes referred to as the "crowd out" phenomena by which extrinsic
motivations displace intrinsic motivations. See Hall, supra note 9, at 510. Too much regulation
can replace intrinsic motivation thereby undermining the perception and reality of trust and
trustworthiness. See Sitkin & Roth, supra note 23 at 369. As Sitkin and Roth conclude:
[A]ttempts to 'remedy' trust violations legalistically frequently fail because they
paradoxically reduce the level of trust rather than reproducing trust. The adoption of
legalistic 'remedies' (i.e., institutionalized mechanisms that mimic legal forms and
exceed legal/regulatory requirements) imposes a psychological and/or an interactional
barrier between the two parties that stimulates an escalating spiral of formality and
distance and leads to a need for more rules. And so the process is perpetuated.
Id.
33. Fiduciary trust becomes relevant in relationships in which trust and power are
asymmetric (i.e., the settlor needs to trust the trustee, but the trustee need not trust the settlor;
the settlor is unable to monitor or control the behavior of the trustee and therefore is particularly
vulnerable to trustee malfeasance). See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795,
808-16 (1983) (discussing the risk of abuse in fiduciary relationships). Asymmetric distribution of
knowledge exists in relationships between professionals and their clients/patients thereby
creating a situation requiring fiduciary trust. See BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
TRUST 15 (1983) (arguing that fiduciary trust prevents abuse when a disparity of knowledge and
power exists).
34. Thus, Greenspan's observation: "Although business transactions are governed by laws
and contracts, if even a modest fraction of those transactions had to be adjudicated, our courts
would be swamped into immobility." Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Policy Report for 2002,
supra note 1. We note the debate between contractarians, who believe that the corporation
consists of a set of contractual relationships controlled by legal and market incentives, and
anticontractarians, who believe that the corporation must be governed by more than contract
law. For the contractarian view, see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting out of
1122 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 56:1113
C. Reputation as Formed by Trust-Generating Institutions
Another way to reinforce social trust and trustworthy behavior
is through public dissemination of information about the character of
individuals, essentially, their reputations as being either trustworthy
or not. Reputation is "what is generally said or believed about [a]
person's or thing's character"3 5 or an "attribute ascribed to one . . . by
another."36 Thus, persons who have had positive trust relations with A
might say that A is trustworthy, an empirical statement based on
observation of A's past behavior. Operationally, reputation is
predictive, and to the extent that past behavior is an indicator of
future behavior, one might suppose that A is likely to be trustworthy
in future relationships. 37 Lacking prior direct observation of a person's
trustworthiness, the most important determinant of interpersonal
trust may be that person's reputation among others who have had
ongoing exchange relations with that individual. One is exposed to
exploitation in a situation involving uncertainty or lack of information
about another's intentions and motivations or the quality of goods or
services to be exchanged. Faced with greater risks, people prefer to
deal with individuals of known reputation even in the presence of
other trust-generating institutions.38  This preference makes a
reputation for trustworthiness extremely valuable for the holder. 39 As
uncertainty increases, reputation becomes an even more important
determinant; 40 therefore, it is in a person's interest to manage her
reputation.
41
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990). For a trust.
based refutation of contractarian approaches, see Blair & Stout, supra note 9.
35. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 634 (R.E. Allen ed. 1984).
36. Robert Wilson, Reputations in Games and Markets, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF
BARGAINING 27 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985).
37. Id. at 27-28.
38. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490-91 (1985):
The widespread preference for transacting with individuals of known reputation
implies that few are actually content to rely on either generalized morality or
institutional arrangements to guard against trouble .... [Instead] social relations,
rather than institutional arrangements for generalized morality, are mainly
responsible for the production of trust in economic life.
39. When discussing reputational value, game theorists refer to a reputation for keeping
trusts; however, a more expansive perspective might include "a reputation for being motivated
by moral commitments-a reputation for possessing a certain kind of character." Daniel M.
Hausman, Trustworthiness and Self-Interest, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1767, 1777 (2002).
40. See generally Peter Kollock, The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental
Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust, 100 AM. J. SOC. 313 (1994) (examining
uncertainty and the role of reputation in exchange relations).
41. This concept is sometimes referred to as image or "impression management." See
generally BARRY R. SCHLENKER, IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT: THE SELF-CONCEPT, SOCIAL
PUBLIC INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING
Likewise, knowing someone's reputation is valuable to the
extent that it decreases the risk of trusting. In this sense, the social
institutions through which information about a person's character is
exchanged are trust-generating institutions that reduce the risk of
trusting. To the extent that someone has a public reputation, in
essence, it is the public opinion of that person's character which is
rhetorically constructed through public discourse. This discourse may
take place in the public sphere through news, advertising,
entertainment, and other media. An interesting information age
example is found on the Internet auction site, eBay, which provides
buyers the opportunity to rate the trustworthiness of sellers. 42
Individuals that rely on such reputation-mediating institutions are
placing their trust in those institutions to convey accurate information
about an individual's trustworthiness; however, such information is
not necessarily accurate 43 and could be shaped by the individual's own
reputation management efforts.
Society's interest in the accuracy of this information is reflected
in the development of defamation law, which gives individuals a
mechanism to respond to inaccurate and damaging information about
their character. 44 Society has a deeper interest in reputation to the
IDENTITY, AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1980) (discussing impression management); WILLIAM
L. BENOIT, ACCOUNTS, EXCUSES, AND APOLOGIES: A THEORY OF IMAGE RESTORATION STRATEGIES
(1995) (examining ways that individuals attempt to minimize damage to their reputations
focusing on apologies, excuse-making, and accounting for behavior). In some societies, reputation
is so valuable that individuals are willing to risk their lives to preserve it. See Douglas H. Yarn,
The Lawyer as Duelist's Friend: Lessons From the Code Duello, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 69
(2002) (using the duel as an example of a model of civility and pattern of behavior for lawyers )
42. See, e.g., Sulin Ba & Paul A. Pavlou, Evidence of the Effect of Trust Building Technology
in Electronic Markets: Price Premiums and Buyer Behavior, MGMT. INFO. SYS. Q., Dec. 2002, at
243 (arguing that trust feedback mechanisms can encourage trust); Chrysanthos Dellarocas,
Analyzing the Economic Efficiency of eBay-Like Online Reputation Reporting Mechanisms
(M.I.T. Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Sloan Working Paper No. 4181-01, 2001) (discussing the rating
system in which e-Bay buyers judge sellers), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=289968
(last visited Mar. 12, 2003). But see Mary M. Calkins, My Reputation Always Had More Fun
Than Me: The Failure of Ebay's Feedback Model to Effectively Prevent Online Auction Fraud, 7
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 33 (2001) (arguing that eBay's feedback system is unreliable), available at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i4/notel.html (last visited, March 17, 2003).
43. See, e.g., Werner Raub & Jeroen Weesie, Reputation and Efficiency in Social
Interactions: An Example of Network Effects, 96 Am. J. SOC. 626, 626 (1990) (arguing that the
efficiency of reputation in social interaction is dependent upon the "embeddedness" of the social
system, that is the timeliness within which actors are informed on the behavior of their
partners).
44. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1986) (arguing that defamation law protects three
distinct conceptions of an individual's reputation).
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extent that reputation, like social trust, is a public good. 45 The
reputations of our leaders and public figures facilitate their fulfillment
of the public trust and their effective performance. 46 These reputations
also reflect the represented community's reputation and help form its
identity.
47
D. Application to Different Objects of Trust
Applying the concepts of trust, trust-generating institutions,
and reputation to different objects of trust, one can conclude that what
produces trust in those objects may vary. An object of trust might be a
natural person to whom I make myself vulnerable. 48 I may place
interpersonal trust in my lawyer because of our previous interactions,
because my lawyer has a good reputation, or because lawyers are
required to complete a specialized education, pass the bar exam, and
adhere to a professional code of conduct. In the first instance, the
previous encounters provide firsthand experience by which I could
confirm my lawyer's trustworthiness. In the third instance, social
institutional trust leads to interpersonal trust. I trust my lawyer
because I trust the external social mechanisms created to promote
trustworthy behavior among all lawyers, such as educational
requirements, ethical codes, and malpractice law. Conversely, I may
develop trust in those mechanisms because my satisfactory encounters
with my lawyer confirm the social institution's trustworthiness. In
the second instance, I trust the source of the reputation which could
either be a trusted individual-for example, a relative who used the
same lawyer-or a trusted institution-a bar referral service, for
example. Ultimately, I may be relying on much more nebulous
reputation-mediating institutions, including public opinion, which
could be expressed, for example, in a magazine article on the "city's
top lawyers," or the lawyer's own advertising.
It is unclear whether trust is caused and experienced
differently when the object is an institution rather than a natural
person.49 I may trust my bank, a classic object of institutional trust,
because, from previous encounters, I trust the person who runs the
45. See generally Robert Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 743 (1986) (contending that reputation is an interpersonal relationship that shapes how one
functions in society).
46. See id. at 744-75 (discussing the importance of reputation to public figures).
47. See id.
48. See Russell Hardin, Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions, in STRATEGY AND CHOICE
187 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) (using an example to illustrate trusting an individual).




bank, or I may trust the banking regulation system and the FDIC and
therefore choose to deposit my money, or I choose the bank based on
its reputation, whether generated by word-of-mouth, business news, or
the bank's own advertising. While I may never develop a personal
relationship of trust with a particular employee or manager of the
bank, I may come to trust the bank itself as a result of the satisfactory
service I experience. Although the trust experiences may not differ
among these objects of trust, natural persons and institutions, there
are some differences arising from the fact that a corporation is not
human. A corporation has culture rather than character. It has no
intentions or motivations upon which to base trust, nor can it feel a
compulsion to be trustworthy. A corporation exhibits intent,
motivation, integrity, and trustworthiness only to the extent that the
natural persons who own, manage, direct, or work for it do so and
create a corporate culture that is responsive to those who place their
trust in it.
Whatever the object of trust, natural person or corporation, we
trust because we are merely inclined to do so, our previous experience
confirms the object's trustworthiness, and trust-generating
institutions, including those that mediate reputation, reduce the risk
of trusting. In the latter case, the object of our trust includes the trust-
generating institutions themselves.
So how do these concepts of trust, trust-generating institutions,
and reputation apply to a large, publicly traded business corporation
like Enron? Stated simplistically, a business corporation is a
collective, commercial venture formed to make profit and recognized
by law as a distinct entity.50 Persons who can affect or are affected by
corporate activities are "stakeholders," of which there are two
categories: those in the transactional environment and those in the
contextual environment.5' Transactional stakeholders are composed
50. A corporation is:
An entity (usu. a business) having authority under law to act as a single person
distinct from the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock and exist
indefinitely; a group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal
rules into a legal or juristic person that has legal personality distinct from the natural
persons who make it up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and has the legal powers
that its constitution gives it.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999); see also supra note 34 (discussing contractarian and
anticontractarian views of corporations).
51. See MATTHIAS WINTER & ULRICH STEGER, MANAGING OUTSIDE PRESSURE: STRATEGIES
FOR PREVENTING CORPORATE DISASTERS 9-13 (1998) (explaining the stakeholder concept and two
types of stakeholders). See generally William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder
Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY & BUSINESS 97 (Tom
L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 3d ed. 1988).
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of internal and external cooperating constituents. 52  Internal
constituents include directors, managers, employees, and
shareholders. 53  External constituents include lenders, vendors,
suppliers, and customers. 54 Some of these groups are particularly
vulnerable to corporate abuses of trust exemplified by Enron's loss of
employee pensions and stock values. Lenders and suppliers exposed
themselves to uncollectible loans.55 Customers risk either receiving
substandard products and services or never receiving these products
or services at all. 56 Trust among these internal constituents and
external cooperators is necessary for corporate efficiency.
57
Unfortunately for most transactional stakeholders dealing with
a corporation, large corporations with their limited liability and
personal anonymity provide ample opportunity for abusing trust.
58
Because of the impersonal nature of such corporations, individuals
and constituencies within a large corporation are less accountable and
less exposed to personal retribution by individuals harmed by the
corporation's abuse of trust.59  The costs of guarding against
untrustworthy behavior are often so high that the only solution is to
extend trust to others. For example, most shareholders must place
their trust in corporate management because they do not have the
resources to determine whether or not the executives of a publicly held
corporation are acting in a way to maximize shareholder value or
52. See WINTER & STEGER, supra note 51, at 11.
53. See id. at 11-12.
54. See id. (providing some examples).
55. See id. at 12 (providing chart with possible demands on these groups).
56. See id. (providing chart with possible demands on these groups).
57. See, e.g., Richard Butler, A Transactional Approach to Organizing Efficiency:
Perspectives from Markets, Hierarchies, and Collectives, 15 ADMIN. & SOC'Y. 323 (1983)
(discussing the market, hierarchy, and collective as organizational forms for business
transactions); Ralph Chami & Connel Fullenkamp, Trust and Efficiency, 26 J. BANKING & FIN.
1785 (2002) (arguing that trust within a firm increases efficiency); Roderick M. Kramer, Trust
and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions, 50 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 569 (1999) (surveying major themes and contemporary perspectives regarding trust in
organizations); Ronald C. Nyhan & Herbert A. Marlowe Jr., Development and Psychometric
Properties of the Organizational Trust Inventory, 21 EVALUATION REV. 614 (1997) (reviewing the
relationship between trust and organizational theory); Giancarlo Spagnolo, Social Relations and
Cooperation in Organizations, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1999) (discussing the impact of
social relations, including trust, on cooperation within organizations); Hwee Hoon Tan & Christy
S.F. Tan, Toward the Differentiation of Trust in Supervisor and Trust in Organization, 126
GENETIC SOC. & GEN. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 241 (2000) (distinguishing trust in supervisor
from trust in organization).
58. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Law, Community, and Communication, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1654
(implying that natural persons in their corporate roles can disassociate their corporate activity
from themselves thereby acting in ways they would otherwise view as immoral).
59. See Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits "Just
Right," 23 J. CORP. L. 245 (1998) (arguing that from a naturalist perspective large megacorporate
structures undermine individual moral responsibility).
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reporting financial health accurately. 60 Many employees must trust
corporate management of their pensions because they are not capable
of determining whether the company is managing their pensions well.
Customers must trust corporate claims of quality because they are
incapable of making that determination on technically complicated or
goods and services that are difficult to compare.
Alternatively or consecutively, shareholders, employees, and
customers can place their trust in external trust-generating
institutions, such as laws enforcing contracts, regulating employment
relations, protecting minority shareholders and consumers, and
requiring financial disclosures. Trust in individuals or institutions is
replaced or reinforced functionally by trust in such institutions.61
Corporate constituents may presume that the threat of legal sanctions
and even legislative reaction will restrain corporations from abusing
trust.62 They may place their trust in the trust-mediating institution
of reputation and public opinion reflected in the marketplace,
presuming that the fear of gaining a bad reputation and the benefits
of a good one will promote trustworthy corporate behavior.
Indeed, as it is for a natural person, reputation is important for
a corporation. 63 It is in a corporation's enlightened self-interest to be
60. Considering the disaggregate nature of modern corporate ownership, shareholders of
stock in a large corporation are not owners in the traditional sense because such shareholders
rarely have meaningful control over management decisionmaking. As investors rather than
owners, shareholders conceivably exercise control through the market; however, even this route
of control is ineffectual for individual investors in light of the prevalence and market effect of
large institutional investors. See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Corporations, Shareholders, and Moral
Choice: A New Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 451, 457 n.27
(1989) (citing A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)
as the "first in-depth analysis of the manner in which corporations had altered the nature of
property ownership."
61. See generally Zucker, supra note 23 (discussing institutions and trust production).
62. A breach of trust may result in legal sanctions, and a breach of trust on a large enough
scale can prompt policymakers to create regulatory constraints on the discretion of the company
thereby limiting its efficiency.
63. Reputation is one of several terms describing the relative standing of an organization in
the eyes of various constituencies. Oded Shenkar & Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Reputation,
Image, Prestige, and Goodwill: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Organizational Standing, 50
HUM. REL. 1361, 1362 (1997). Economists prefer the term reputation, while accountants use the
term "goodwill." Id. In marketing, the preferred term is "image." Id. Because reputation is a
neutral term, sociologists, preferring the term "prestige," use "esteem" to refer to a good
reputation. Id. For other definitions of corporate reputation, see Violina Rindova & Charles J.
Fombrun, Fanning the Flame: Corporate Reputations as Social Constructions of Performance
(Mar. 14, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (providing a collective
representation of a firm's past actions and results that describe the firm's ability to deliver
valued outcomes to multiple stakeholders), and Manto Gotsi & Alan M. Wilson, Corporate
Reputation: Seeking a Definition, 6 CORP. COMM.: INT'L J. 24, 29 (2001) ("A corporate reputation
is a stakeholder's overall evaluation of a company over time ... based on direct experiences with
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perceived as trustworthy not only by its transactional stakeholders
but also by its contextual stakeholders such as government agencies,
media, community groups, and the public at large, which is the
ongoing source of future customers, employees, investors, lenders, and
vendors. To the extent that a corporation develops a public reputation
for trustworthiness, it can function more efficiently.
6 4
E. Social Legitimacy as a Component of Corporate Reputation
Although trustworthiness is an important component of a
corporation's reputation, 65 a corporation, unlike a natural person, as
an object of trust must also achieve social legitimacy. 66 As it must with
its reputation of trustworthiness, a business corporation must manage
the public perception of its social legitimacy-the external
67
accountability of the corporation to the broader society within which it
functions. Legal scholars began debating the concept of corporate
social legitimacy in the 1930s 68 and exhumed it in the 1970s under the
rubric of "social responsibility. 69 The concept might be summarized as
the company, any other form of communications and symbolism that provides information about
the firm's actions and/or a comparison with the actions of other leading rivals.").
64. See Peter W. Roberts & Grahame R. Dowling, Corporate Reputation and Sustained
Superior Financial Performance, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1077, 1077 (2002), available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/98517574/START (last visited Mar. 24,
2003); see also Hausman supra note 39, at 1778 ("If a firm does not have a reputation for
trustworthiness, implicit contracts will be tenuous and limited; and the costs of doing business-
that is, of writing and monitoring contracts and supervising employees, suppliers, or neighbors-
will be much higher.") (citing R. Frank, What Price the Moral High Ground?, 63 S. ECON. J. 1, 1-
17 (1996) (presenting a study showing that "firms with a moral reputation will be able to attract
and retain better employees at lower wages")).
65. See Simon A. Booth, How Can Organisations Prepare for Reputational Crises?, 8 J.
CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 197, 198-99 (2000) (noting that reputation is based on five
constituent elements: legitimacy (conformity to expectations, based on a legal/socially acceptable
foundation), reliability (a mixture of competence and consistency), credibility (consistent
truthfulness), confidence (credibility plus consistent message communication), and trust (based
on a comparison of confidence between different organizations)).
66. Institutional legitimacy can be defined in "terms of the existence of a social consensus
that supports the institution, gives it legal sanction, and perhaps even offers it special
privileges." JAMES J. BRUMMER, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGITIMACY: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 74 (1991) (citations omitted).
67. There are internal issues of corporate legitimacy relating to corporate governance, such
as selection and removal of executives, managerial authority, and the rights and identities of
internal constituents. To some extent, internal legitimacy is related more to issues of trust
because it involves transactional stakeholders who are most directly vulnerable to corporate
abuse.
68. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 60 (analyzing how corporations changed property
ownership); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932).
69. See, e.g., MORRELL HEALD, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS: COMPANY AND
COMMUNITY, 1900.1960 (1970); JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970); see also BRUMMER, supra
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follows: Corporate existence is dependent on a social environment that
condones it. Our society recognizes the efficiency of corporate action
and promotes corporate existence through the granting of various
powers, privileges, and limitations on liability. But conversely, in a
society in which large-scale organizations dominate so many aspects of
daily life, the broader public is particularly vulnerable to their
misdeeds and incompetence. This vulnerable public is part of that
broader set of contextual stakeholders affected by the corporation's
actions. 70 The set of potential stakeholders in the general public can be
quite large. All of us are potentially vulnerable to corporate market
manipulation, abuse of the environment, or monopolistic practices.
Trust involves vulnerability, and one relationship between trust and
social legitimacy is as follows: The vulnerable public will extend its
trust ("public trust") if it perceives the exercise of organizational
authority and power as legitimate. 71 Corporate social legitimacy is
achieved if society perceives that the values of the corporation
correspond to its own values and that the corporation meets the
responsibilities assigned to it.72
Much like developing a public reputation of trustworthiness,
this process of legitimizing in a democracy takes place through
discourse in the public sphere.73 The corporation must convince the
public that its exercise of the powers and privileges granted to it is
justifiable;74 therefore, it engages in a rhetorical "process of reason
giving,"75 asserting the congruence of its values with those of the
broader society.
note 66, at 3 ("[L]egitimacy is based upon [social institutions] meeting the responsibilities
assigned to them.").
70. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of stakeholders. Through
"corporate constituency" statutes, many states have recognized managerial discretion to take
into account such stakeholders, as opposed to shareholders. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830
(West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.251(5) (West Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6.1 (West Supp. 2002); N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West Supp. 2002); 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1715-1716 (West 1995).
71. See Edwin M. Epstein, The Historical Enigma of Corporate Legitimacy, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1701, 1703 (1972) ("The ascendancy of large-scale organizations that dominate virtually all
aspects of life ... has made it imperative that the power of these organizations be legitimate.").
72. See BRUMMER, supra note 66, at 3 ("[Ljegitimacy is based upon their meeting the
responsibilities assigned to them.").
73. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 359-87 (William Rehg trans., 1996); Hugh Baxter, System and
Lifeworld in Habermas's Theory of Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 473, 577-85 (2002).
74. See BRUMMER, supra note 66, at 73-74.
75. Robert A. Francesconi, James Hunt, The Wilmington 10, and Institutional Legitimacy,
68 Q. J. SPEECH 47, 50 (1982).
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There are two competing standards for judging legitimacy-
utility and responsibility.76 A corporation's utility is established by its
performance in relation to external standards of economic
effectiveness. 77  Essentially, this metric concerns how well the
corporation "does the job," ranging from demonstrating financial
viability to producing goods or providing services of acceptable quality
and desirability.78 A corporation's responsibility refers to its adherence
to legal and ethical norms-assurance that the corporation "plays by
the rules. '79 This standard implies another relationship between trust
and social legitimacy: fulfilling trusts or behaving in a trustworthy
manner is one of the rules society imposes. The rules might also
include a nebulous concept of acting in the broader public interest or
at least not harming the public.
8 0
Establishing and maintaining corporate legitimacy involves a
difficult balancing act between the two standards. Although utility
directly benefits the shareholders (and management's primary legal
responsibility is to the shareholders) and other transactional
stakeholders, maximizing utility can occur at the expense of the public
interest (e.g., by degrading the environment) and contextual
stakeholders.8 1 In turn, maximizing social responsibility by satisfying
public interest stakeholders can occur at the expense of the
76. There are many theories behind corporate legitimacy. See BRUMMER, supra note 66, at
73-97. This approach is closest to the "performance theory" which judges legitimacy by
referencing the outcomes of a corporation's actions and policies. See id. at 87-89.
77. See Epstein, supra note 71, at 1704 ("Utility requires that an institution ... must not be
evaluated by criteria wholly in the control of or defined by the institution itself."); see also Keith
M. Hearit, "Mistakes Were Made" Organizations, Apologia, and Crises of Social Legitimacy, 46
COMM. STUD. 1, 2 (1995) (referring to this standard as "competence").
78. Epstein, supra note 71, at 1704.
79. Id.
80. The dual nature of corporate legitimacy is reflected in section 2.01 of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance. Section 2.01 is divided into two parts. Subsection
(a) concerns the objective of the corporation and provides that, subject to the provisions of
subsection (b), a corporation "should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with
a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION § 2.01(a) (1994). Subsection (b) provides that
even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business:
(1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set
by law;
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian,
educational, and philanthropic purposes.
Id. § 2.01(b).
81. Hearit, supra note 77, at 3.
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shareholders.8 2 An additional difficulty in maintaining legitimacy
comes from changes in society's expectations. Society needs to
question and to redefine the prevailing norms occasionally; therefore,
the discourse on legitimacy is ongoing and responsive to changing
public perceptions of the corporation's actions and responsibilities.
As with a public reputation for trustworthiness, this
rhetorically constructed and publicly recognized legitimacy is a vital
resource with which a corporation is able to obtain needed resources
such as capital, customers, favorable legal treatment, and labor from
society. The public is able to place its trust in the corporation because
it believes that the corporation will "do the right thing." The more
public trust, the more discretion and leeway granted to corporate
decisionmaking. If the corporation does not conform to legal and social
expectations, however, the public will respond by questioning its
legitimacy and trustworthiness. When a natural person's
trustworthiness is questioned, it may limit that person's ability to
enter into cooperative relationships. When a corporation's
trustworthiness is questioned, it not only limits the corporation's
ability to enter into cooperative relationships, it also may lead to a
corporate social legitimacy crisis.83 As a result of this crisis, society
82. The Article does not weigh in on the longstanding debate regarding the balance of
corporate responsibilities between profit maximization and social responsibility. Compare Edwin
M. Epstein, The Corporate Social Policy Process and the Process of Corporate Governance, 25 AM.
BUS. L.J. 361 (1987) (praising the A.L.l.'s effort to move into the "external" sphere of corporate
legitimacy, which involves obligations of the corporation to diverse segments of society impacted
by its operations), with Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct That Does Not Maximize
Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the
Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1
(1998) (arguing that some corporate actions that are public interest-oriented and appear to be
nonmaximizing are in fact maximizing), and Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy,
Conduct, and Governance-Two Models of the Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1983)
(arguing that profit maximization is most desirable). But see Nesteruk, supra note 60, at 460
(asserting that the distinction between shareholders and the broader public as a stakeholder is
not as clear considering the way in which most stocks of large publicly held corporations are held
by shareholders). Not only does shareholder ownership negate any actual control over the
corporation by the individual investor, but ownership of shares through large mutual funds also
makes the health of the economy and of businesses generally more important than the
profitability of an individual corporation. See id.
83. See Hearit, supra note 77, at 3. The general concept of a business crisis is somewhat
broader. See, e.g., STEVE ALBRECHT, CRISIS MANAGEMENT FOR CORPORATE SELF DEFENSE: HOW
TO PROTECT YOUR ORGANIZATION IN A CRISIS... HOW TO STOP A CRISIS BEFORE IT STARTS 7
(1996) ("[A]n event-specific episode that can make or break you, depending upon the size of your
company, the number of people you employ, the products and services you sell, and the resources
of people, assets, and money you can aim at the problem."); W. TIMOTHY COOMBS, ONGOING
CRISIS COMMUNICATION: PLANNING, MANAGING, AND RESPONDING 2 n.72 (1999) (discussing an
unpredictable event that could have potentially negative results: "The event and its aftermath
may significantly damage an organization and its employees, products, services, financial
condition, and reputation.") (citation omitted). Other categories of business crises include
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may punish the corporation,. and require more trust-generating
regulation, thereby constraining corporate discretion.8 4 Ultimately,
the crisis may threaten the corporation's very existence.
III. INADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL RESPONSES TO SOCIAL LEGITIMACY
CRISES
A. Social Legitimacy Crises, Generally
A corporate social legitimacy crisis results from a public charge
of corporate wrongdoing, an accusation that the corporation has
violated the accepted norms of corporate behavior and, therefore, the
public trust and is indicated by the emergence of public hostility
toward the corporation.8 5  Such charges may emanate from
whistleblowers, disgruntled or public-conscious employees, political
actors, watchdog groups, investigative reporters, or persons injured by
corporate behavior.8 6 Usually, the charges are made public through
dissemination by various forms of mass news media. Upon entering
the public discourse, the mere accusation is sufficient to cause the
crisis, the truthfulness or accuracy of the charge being largely
irrelevant.
8 7
These charges fall into roughly two categories-incompetence
and public irresponsibility.88 A charge of incompetence asserts that
the corporation has failed to do its job properly, i.e., failed to meet the
utility standard of corporate social legitimacy.8 9 Examples include the
wreck of the Exxon Valdez and the resulting disastrous oil spill and,
sudden market shifts, succession of top management, cash flow problems, industrial relations
problems, hostile takeovers, adverse international events, and disruption from regulation or
deregulation. See generally GERALD C. MEYERS, WHEN IT HITS THE FAN: MANAGING THE NINE
CRISES OF BUSINESS (1986).
84. Such regulation is itself a replacement for public trust in the regulated entities. See
generally Zucker, supra note 23.
85. Hearit, supra note 77, at 3.
86. See ALBRECHT, supra note 83, at 17-22 (arguing that crises arise as a result of people
both in and out of the organization pressing their particular agendas).
87. One crisis management guru distinguishes between "character" crises, in which the
organization's acts raise questions of trustworthiness, quality, or competence (e.g., breast
implants, Exxon Valdez, and the 1996 Valuejet crash in the Everglades) and "sniper fire" crisis
caused by external forces (e.g., Tylenol poisoning and syringes in Pepsi-Cola). ERIC DEZENHALL,
NAIL 'EM!: CONFRONTING HIGH-PROFILE ATTACKS ON CELEBRITIES & BUSINESSES 91 (1999).
88. See Hearit, supra note 77, at 4. Another authority distinguishes between four types of
corporate social legitimacy crises-technological (Bhopal), confrontational (boycotts), malevolent
(Tylenol poisoning and rumors about the Procter and Gamble logo), and management failure
(E.F. Hutton). See OTTO LERBINGER, MANAGING CORPORATE CRISES: STRATEGIES FOR
EXECUTIVES (1986).
89. Hearit, supra note 77, at 4.
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more recently, the SUV rollover accidents allegedly resulting from
design or production flaws in either the Ford Explorer or Firestone
tires. 90 In the case of the Exxon Valdez, the underlying charge was
that Exxon's incompetence violated public values of environmental
protection. 91 In the case of the Ford Explorer, the underlying charge
was that design or manufacturing incompetence of either Ford or
Firestone had violated public values of producing safe products.
92
A charge of public irresponsibility asserts a violation of the
norms of public responsibility to the community in which the
corporation operates, i.e., it failed to meet the responsibility standard
of corporate social legitimacy. 93 Here, public trust is more deeply
implicated because the actions are intentional. Examples include the
accusation, prompted by a series of automobile accidents, that
Domino's Pizza's policy of quick delivery endangered its drivers and
placed the public at risk,94 the accusation that Chrysler was rolling
back the mileage on odometers of cars driven by its executives and
sold to the public as new,95 and the accusation that McDonald's was
using beef flavoring in its French fries which it touted as suitable for
vegetarians. 96 Although involving nonprofits, accusations that the Red
Cross misused 9/11 funds and that the Roman Catholic Church quietly
reassigned pedophilic priests to other parishes prompted crises for
both organizations. The charges that Enron engaged in deceptive
90. See, e.g., James R. Healey, Special Report: Firestone Leaves an Indelible Mark, USA
TODAY, Dec. 26, 2000, at IB; Keith Naughton & Mark Hosenball, Ford vs. Firestone, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 18, 2000, at 26; Alex Taylor, III, Jac Nasser's Biggest Test, FORTUNE, Sept. 18, 2000, at 123;
Daniel Eisenberg, Anatomy of a Recall; How a Small-Town Lawsuit in Texas Cascaded into the
Biggest Consumer Panic Since the Tylenol Scare, Plaguing Firestone and Ford with Allegations of
Factory Flaws and Design Errors, TIME, Sept. 11, 2000, at 11; John Greenwald, Firestone's Tire
Crisis; The Company Recalls 6.5 Million of Its Most Widely Used Tires. Did It Act Fast Enough?,
Time, Aug. 21, 2000, at 64.
91. Hearit, supra note 77, at 4.
92. See supra note 90.
93. Hearit, supra note 77, at 5.
94. The Domino's Pizza case is examined extensively in Hearit, supra note 77, at 5-12.
95. See, e.g., Keith M. Hearit, Apologies and Public Relations Crises at Chrysler, Toshiba,
and Volvo, 20 PUB. REL. REV. 115 (1994); Christine Dugas, Chrysler's Odometer Crisis: Managing
the Public Response, NEWSDAY, July 8, 1987, at 47, available at 1987 WL 2695482; Iacocca Offers
Apology: Chrysler to Extend Warranties, Replace Some Cars, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 2,
1987, at 1A, available at 1987 WL 4724894; Jim Mateja & Michael Tackett, Chrysler Odometer
Fraud Charged, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1987, at 1, available at 1987 WL 2964748; Tom Peters, The
News Is That Iacocca's Response Made News, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1987, at 6, available at 1987
WL 2972922; James Risen, Iacocca Admits Mileage Tampering Was "Dumb" Apologizes for
Chrysler's New Car "Test-Drives" by Its Managers with Odometers Disconnected, L.A. TIMES, July
2, 1987, at 1, available at 1987 W 2162230.
96. See, e.g., Steve Lash, McDonald's to List Natural-Flavor Ingredients, FOOD CHEMICAL
NEWS, Aug. 20, 2001, at 10; Ameet Sachdev, McDonald's Apologizes for Fries 'Confusion,' CHI.
TRIB., May 25, 2001, at Business.
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accounting tactics and that Arthur Andersen compromised its
auditing function in favor of its consulting business are charges of
public irresponsibility.
B. Traditional Responses and Corporate Apologia
Faced with an accusation of wrongdoing and a looming
legitimacy crisis, what is a corporation to do? Management literature
is replete with crisis management advice, most of which emphasizes
prevention and preplanning; however, most agree that communication
is the key.97 If corporate legitimacy is established through public
discourse and public discourse about corporate behavior causes
corporate legitimacy crises, then the response must take the form of
public communication. Noncommunicative responses, even if
legitimate, are ineffectual by definition. Ignoring the problem is not
likely to resolve it even if the charge is false. Although the attention
of the public may shift elsewhere eventually, avoidance is usually poor
damage control. A false charge may stick, and a true charge may
reveal a real problem that will persist without corrective action. Even
if the corporation responds privately and internally by ferreting out a
real problem and fixing it so it will not recur, it can only solve its
legitimacy crisis by engaging in public discourse to reassure the public
that it deserves its trust. Public relations campaigns, which may
become intensified during a social legitimacy crisis, simply reassert
the corporation's adherence to public values and are not directly
responsive to the accusation.
A corporate apologia is a public response to a social legitimacy
crisis-a rhetorical reaction to public criticism in an attempt to reduce
public animosity and to reestablish legitimacy. 98 Its dual purpose is to
distance the corporation from the alleged wrongdoing and to reaffirm
the corporation's commitment to public values and corrective action, if
necessary. 99 Apologia is not the same as an apology. The latter
involves an admission of wrongdoing and acceptance of
97. See, e.g., ALBRECHT, supra note 83, at 83; KATHLEEN FEARN-BANKS, CRISIS
COMMUNICATIONS: A CASEBOOK APPROACH 2 (2002) (defining crisis communication); HEATH,
supra note 83, at 146-69 (stressing media management); LERBINGER, supra note 88, at 83-91;
MARION K. PINSDORF, COMMUNICATING WHEN YOUR COMPANY IS UNDER SIEGE: SURVIVING
PUBLIC CRISIS (3d ed., 1999); WINTER & STEGER, supra note 51, at 244 (discussing
communication and public relations management).
98. See generally B.L. Ware & W.A. Linkugel, They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the
Generic Criticism of Apologia, 59 Q. J. SPEECH 273 (1973) (discussing apologia as use of public
communication to defend one's self from public attack).
99. See Hearit, supra note 77, at 6.
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responsibility, 100 neither of which is appropriate if the corporation
believes that the accusation is unfounded. Corporate apologia may
include an apology, particularly if the corporation acknowledges the
wrongdoing, but is best defined as a public self-defense by which the
organization responds to criticism by presenting a justification of its
behavior through a "compelling, counter account of its actions."101
An "account" is a statement used to explain behavior and to
protect reputation from a threat. 10 2 There are a number of account
strategies ranging from defensive to accommodative. 103 Defensive
strategies deny responsibility and attempt to protect reputation at the
expense of victims of the behavior. They include obfuscation ("well,
this is a very complex accounting issue"), deflection ("the real problem
is the regulatory system"), attacking the accuser ("this accusation was
made by a highly unstable, disgruntled ex-employee"), denial ("we
didn't do it"), excuse ("we had no control of the situation"), and
justification ("the accident occurred while we were in pursuit of the
greater good and no serious damage resulted"). Accommodative
strategies, such as an apology, are those that accept responsibility,
help victims, and correct the problem. 10 4 Different strategies may be
appropriate for different crisis situations. If the corporation's
responsibility for the problem is weak, then defensive strategies may
be appropriate and vice versa. 105
McDonald's apologia related to animal products in its
"vegetarian" French fries is a recent example of classic corporate
apologia. It stated that
... mistakes were made in communicating to the public and customers about the
ingredients in our French fries and hash browns. Those mistakes included instances in
which French fries and hash browns sold at U.S. restaurants were improperly identified
as "vegetarian." We regret we did not provide these customers with complete
information, and we sincerely apologize for any hardship that these miscommunications
have caused among Hindus, vegetarians and others. We should have done a better job in
these areas, and we're committed to doing a better job in the future.
As a direct result of these events, McDonald's has enhanced its disclosures concerning
the source of ingredients in its food products ... has created a Dietary
Practice/Vegetarian Advisory Panel consisting of experts in consumer dietary
100. See Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas H. Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L.
REV. 1121, 1131-40 (discussing definition and nuances of apology). For apology in the context of
corporations, see generally Taryn Fuchs.Burnett, Mass Public Corporate Apology, 57 DiSP.
RESOL. J., July 2002, at 27.
101. Hearit, supra note 77, at 3.
102. See BENOIT, supra note 41.
103. See W.L. Benoit, Image Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication, 23 PUB. REL. REV.
177 (1997) (listing fourteen strategies of apologia).




practices ... [and] is donating $10 million to Hindu, vegetarian and other groups whose
charitable and educational activities are closely linked to the concerns of these
consumers.106
Consistent with the dual purpose of distancing the corporation
from the alleged wrongdoing and reaffirming the corporation's
commitment to public values, McDonald's apologia has two parts, a
negative rhetoric through which the corporation distances itself from
the alleged wrongful act and a positive rhetoric through which it
reaffirms its commitment to prevailing social values. 10 7 The company's
apologia strategy was largely accommodative in keeping with the level
of responsibility it bore.
Exxon's defensive response to accusations of wrongdoing in the
Valdez disaster is considered a textbook case of disastrous
communications during a corporate social legitimacy crisis.108 After
failing to shift the blame to Captain Hazelwood, Exxon published an
apologia in the form of an advertisement entitled "An Open Letter to
the Public," described by one commentator as "a formal, one-time
public defense of its actions in which the company attempted to limit
the editorial power of the media and take its case directly to the
American public."10 9 Unfortunately for Exxon, the apologia backfired
because the facts emerging about Exxon's culpability in the wreck (it
had reduced crew sizes on the tankers) and incompetence in the
cleanup (it acted sluggishly and engaged in scientifically criticized
cleanup methods) belied the statements in its apologia. In turn, this
further undermined public trust and sustained Exxon's legitimacy
crisis. 110
In contrast, Johnson & Johnson was not responsible for tainted
Tylenol, which killed several people, nor was Pepsi-Cola responsible
for syringes found in its products; however, in both cases, the
companies communicated the facts as known to the company to the
public and took immediate action to protect the public by recalling the
products in question. 1 ' Although lack of responsibility made these
apologias easier to make, both cases are cited as successful examples
of corporate response to legitimacy crises.
106. For the full text of the apologia, see Notices, EDELMAN, COMBS & LATTURNER, L.L.C., at
http://www.edcombs.com/CM/Notices/Notices158.asp.
107. Hearit, supra note 77, at 6.
108. See FEARN-BANKS, supra note 97, at 100-01; ROBERT HEATH, CRISIS MANAGEMENT FOR
MANAGERS AND EXECUTIVES 148-49 (1998).
109. Hearit, supra note 77, at 5
110. See id. at 11-12; see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, When Bad Things
Happen to Good Companies: A Crisis Management Primer, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 951, 952 (1994).
111. See FEARN-BANKS, supra note 97, at 86-96 (Johnson & Johnson), 236-45 (Pepsi-Cola);
Pitt & Groskaufmanis supra note 110, at 951-52 (Johnson & Johnson).
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C. Corporate Legitimacy Crises in a Post-Enron Environment
We believe that in the current social and economic
environment, traditional responses to corporate social legitimacy
crises are increasingly ineffective regardless of the corporation's level
of responsibility. First, corporate legitimacy crises are increasingly
common. Globalization and the impersonal nature of our society,
combined with the vast reach of corporate activity in the lives of large
numbers of people, cause corporate errors and abuses to have wide-
ranging effects, increasing the likelihood of a crisis.1 12 In fact, the
situation has given rise to a moderately successful and widespread
antiglobalization movement targeting international corporations.
113
Second, revelations about Enron and other companies have
exacerbated distrust of corporations and of trust-generating
institutions more generally. Although there has been a general trend
toward distrust of public institutions, businesses historically have
been vilified, and intense periods of corporate scandal reporting are
not uncommon, 114 the current spate of corporate scandals seems to
have tainted all business corporations to some degree and generated a
particularly high level of public distrust. Corporate speech is viewed
with increasing skepticism, despite the sincerity of many corporate
executives and board members.11 5 Corporate speech generally, and
self-generated apologia particularly, is likely to be viewed by the
public as strategic or instrumentalist (oriented toward the success of
the corporation's goals) rather than communicative (oriented toward
reaching agreement, finding truth, or building community).
1 6
112. See PETER SCHWARTZ & BLAIR GIBB, WHEN GOOD COMPANIES Do BAD THINGS:
RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 9-23 (1999).
113. Note the success of the Green Party in 2000 and Ralph Nader's 2000 presidential
campaign based largely on anticorporate sentiment.
114. In the 1980s, the focus was on Michael Milken, Ivan Boesky, the savings-and-loan
scandals, and defense contracting abuses as well as on Bhopal and the Exxon Valdez disasters.
Casebooks discuss these crises. See, e.g., IAN I. MITROFF & THIERRY C. PAUCHANT, "WE'RE SO BIG
AND POWERFUL NOTHING BAD CAN HAPPEN TO US": AN INVESTIGATION OF AMERICA'S CRISIS
PRONE CORPORATIONS (1990).
115. The business press has quoted corporate crisis experts as subscribing to the notion of an
increasingly cynical and skeptical public. See e.g., Crisis? What Crisis? BRAND STRATEGY, Aug.
21, 2002, at 20, available at 2002 WL 15824009; Aaron Bernstein, Too Much Corporate Power?,
BUS. WK., Sept. 11, 2000, at 144 (quoting Ruy Teixeira, a pollster with the Century Foundation
(Washington-based think tank): '"There's a widespread sense of unfairness and distrust today,
where people think companies are not quite playing by the rules.").
116. Habermas distinguishes between two types of discursive action--communicative action
and strategic communication-and observes that the point of the organizational speech act is
instrumental. See JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY ch. 1
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
ch. III (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981). We note that there is increasing public cynicism and
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Traditional defensive responses to corporate legitimacy crises are
likely to backfire, particularly if the emerging facts contradict the
corporation's communications. Public relations campaigns are viewed
as cynical and self-serving by an increasingly sophisticated and
skeptical public.11
7
Once distrustful, the public will remain wary in its response to
the distrusted institutions' communications. It is no longer adequate
to issue a press release that states: "We are looking into it, and if
there is a problem, we will correct it," or "Mistakes were made, and we
have fixed them." If the public is going to accept the apologia,
reinstate the corporation's legitimacy, extend its trust, and resume
beneficial collaboration and relationships, the assertions made in the
apologia must be verified by some independent, trusted institution.
Unfortunately, the public has reasons to be wary of these
institutions as well. Enron executives were closely connected with the
highest levels of the government. The independent auditing system
not only failed miserably in detecting the abuses, it even participated
in them to some degree. It is now widely known that the accounting
industry actively opposed reforms that may have prevented some of
the abuses and that its primary lobbyist was Harvey Pitt,118 former
chairman of the SEC, which itself could be criticized for its failure to
prevent these abuses. 119 Congressman Tauzin, chairing one of the
House committees developing reforms, was a previous champion of the
antireform lobby. 120 Burdened by conflicts of interest, financial
analysts failed to provide objective assessments and in some cases
gave glowing assessments of companies that they knew were
unsound. 12' In this sense, the trust-generating institutions that
skepticism concerning the recent widespread use of public apology. See O'Hara & Yarn, supra
note 100, at 1156.
117. In the public relations industry, emergency crisis consultants "have become a staple of
corporate life." PR Industry Defends Work for Allina, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., July 14, 2001, at
1D. Considering the many management books on how to handle the media and maintain
corporate image, one might sense that corporate communications are purely strategic and lack
sincerity.
118. Ironically, Pitt coauthored an article on corporate crisis management in the early 1990s
which also forewarned of an "Age of Retribution" that would be particularly bad for corporations
because of increasing litigation and liability exposure, overzealous public prosecutors and
government regulators armed with enhanced civil and criminal sanctions, and a growing
tendency to vilify business. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 110, at 956-59.
119. From another perspective, the failure of the regulatory system can be viewed as an
example of law's limits in maintaining trustworthy behavior. See supra notes 30-34 and
accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Peter Beinart, Accounting, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 2002, at 6 (describing
Congressman Tauzin's success in stalling pre-Enron accounting regulation efforts).
121. "Salomon Smith Barney lead telecom analyst Jack Grubman, who was investigated by
regulators for his role in the rise and fall of WorldCom Inc., resigned [in August, 2002]."
Salomon's Jack Grubman Resigns, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, available at
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provide people with enough confidence to extend their trust to these
corporations have themselves failed and are now distrusted.
The nature of modern mass media complicates today's
legitimacy crisis. It is through mass media that corporations assert
their legitimacy and that reputations are formed; however, it is also
through the mass media that allegations of corporate wrongdoing are
reported. Such reports attract an audience, which in turn encourages
the increasingly competitive news organizations to report more
allegations of wrongdoing. In their efforts to do so, the news media
provides a seemingly uncritical forum to any person or special interest
group with a grudge or an accusation. Technology allows for the
immediate and worldwide dissemination of this information. The
public and market reaction can be immediate, which in the case of
Enron virtually destroyed the company in a matter of days.
The immediate and pervasive nature of modern information
dissemination is particularly problematic for corporations faced with
untrue allegations of wrongdoing. Who will verify their denial? The
courts may eventually verify the corporation's claim that an allegation
of wrongdoing was false or unjustified. Unfortunately, the harm, loss
of reputation and loss of public trust, has already occurred by the time
the facts are established at trial. Although it is certainly unfair for
innocent corporations to suffer from malicious or unsubstantiated
allegations of wrongdoing, an otherwise good company can suffer
disproportionately from the wrongful acts of a small internal
constituency. Such a company might respond to an allegation of
wrongdoing in good faith, fire the wrongdoers, act so as to prevent
such abuses in the future, and issue an apologia, but without some
form of independent verification, the public may continue to distrust
the organization, causing its demise. Such a fate may be well deserved
if the allegations are true and if the corporation is pervaded by a
culture that promotes abuse of the public trust; however, it seems an
overly extreme sanction to be borne by the innocent constituents of an
otherwise good company. Not only will individuals suffer, but society
will also bear the cost, 122 including increased regulation that may not
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20020815-103345-3605r.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2003). In a settlement with the State of New York over allegations that its investment advice
was tainted by conflicts of interest, Merrill Lynch paid a $100 million fine and agreed to institute
a number of significant reforms. See Press Release, Office of the New York Attorney General,
Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to Reform Investment
Practices: Merrill Lynch to Pay $100 Million Penalty, (May 21, 2002), at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/may/may21a-02.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
122. The social consequences include unemployment, pension collapses, displacement of
persons, complete loss of shareholder value, and less competition in that company's industry.
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be needed and could contribute to a more distrustful atmosphere. 123 It
seems both inefficient and unnecessary to cause the destruction of a
potentially legitimate and productive organization while society bears
the attendant social costs. Moreover, nothing has been done to rebuild
public trust-a condition which could have deeper economic
consequences if left unaddressed.
124
The media companies, which could respond faster than the
courts, have neither the resources to verify corporate apologia nor the
inclination to do so. Media pandering to the public appetite for
schadenfreude and its need to create villains and conduct witch
hunts 25 is likely to be more sensitive to ratings than to the truth, and
the speed of reporting can come at the expense of accuracy. By the
time the truth emerges, the harm has been done, and while
wrongdoing might get front-page headlines, corrections and
retractions rarely do.
Indeed, the media, as arbiter of corporate reputation and
protector of the public interest, is suffering from its own legitimacy
crisis. While it should be praised for its role in uncovering corporate
abuses of the public trust, the media appear to have been a
complacent participant in helping to create the environment in which
the abuses could take place. Many of the most abusive corporations
and their executives maintained stellar reputations until the
wrongdoing was exposed. In addition, the news media's
123. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; see also Brian R. Cheffins, Trust, Loyalty
and Cooperation in the Business Community: Is Regulation Required?, in THE REALM OF
COMPANY LAW (Barry A.K. Rider ed., 1998):
While trust, loyalty and related norms may have a crucial economic role to play, it
does not follow that regulation should be used to foster their development. Since it is
sensible business practice to act in a cooperative manner, laws of this character will
often be redundant and could in fact serve to reduce reliance on trust and loyalty.
Also, using the legal system to try to ensure that trust and related concepts are
crucial elements in a country's business culture will provide a platform for
opportunistic litigation and might lead to the introduction of a bureaucratic
enforcement regime. [,]
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=156510.
124. Societies which suffer from a large degree of distrust fail to flourish economically. See
generally Knack & Zak, supra note 25. Knack and Zak's work is also instructive to the extent it
shows that an atmosphere of distrust is likely in a society that is less homogeneous and in which
interpersonal trust is low. See generally id.
125. Although most books on corporate crisis management discuss how to handle the media
during a crisis, only a few discuss the role of the media in creating such crises, thereby painting
the media as either antagonistic toward business corporations or merely responsive to cultural
trends. See, e.g., DEZENHALL, supra note 87, at 11-19 (arguing that we live in a "culture of
attack" motivated by enjoyment of another's misfortune (schadfreude) and nebulous personal
fears which create a witch-hunt mentality and that to compete, the media strives to pique the
culture's rage through "attack programming" news shows such as 60 Minutes, Primetime, 48
Hours, and Dateline); see also ALBRECHT, supra note 83, at 17-19 (arguing that this is an "age of




trustworthiness has been placed in doubt by its unchecked desire for
sensationalism, which has led to its own abuses of the public trust,
such as jumping to the conclusion that Richard Jewell was the Atlanta
Olympics bomber, exaggeration and subterfuge in fabricating a
scandal around Food Lion's handling of expired foods, and the
manipulation of a crash test of a GM pickup truck to ensure an
audience-grabbing gas tank explosion on film.' 26
In the current environment of corporate illegitimacy and public
distrust of other trust-generating institutions, combined with the
media's inability to separate rumor from reality and the courts'
inability to establish the facts in time, new trust-generating
institutions may be necessary to verify corporate apologia and to
create the public trust and confidence necessary to resume beneficial
corporate relations.
IV. PUBLIC INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING
Major organizations in severe legitimacy crises sometimes
reinforce their apologia by engaging eminent persons as independent
fact finders. We believe this development is a promising trust-
generating process in the current environment of distrust. The concept
is at the cottage industry stage, conducted ad hoc by a few able public
figures; however, it is moving toward institutionalization. In this
section, we examine the various forms of fact-finding, distinguish and
give some examples of public independent fact-finding, and identify
some of the fundamental characteristics of that process.
Generally, fact-finding is an extrajudicial, 127 problem-solving
process in which a third party, or fact finder, investigates facts
relevant to a controversy and issues a report establishing the relevant
facts.' 28 The fact finder is a person or group, often with technical
expertise, 29  who is usually impartial, thereby lending more
126. See DEZENHALL, supra note 87, at 192-98, 204, 207, 258-59 (discussing Jewell. Food
Lion, and GM).
127. Broadly defined, fact-finding is a "process of determining the facts relevant to the
controversy and, as such, [is] a crucial aspect of most dispute resolution processes," including
adjudication. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 178 (Douglas Yarn ed., 1999). This Article is
limited to the form of fact-finding that occurs outside the ambit of the courts and formal
adjudication.
128. Id.
129. Fact-finding is distinguishable from "expert assessment" and "case evaluation,"
processes in which an independent third party with specific expertise is called upon to give an
opinion concerning the relative strengths and weaknesses of parties' cases, the likely outcome of
a litigated matter, or a reasonable settlement. Id. at 68-69, 173-74. Expert assessment
is appropriate where the factual background to the dispute is relatively
straightforward and the parties are relying on the particular expertise of the expert to
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persuasive power to the findings. It can be used in two ways, as
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and as self-critical analysis
("SCA"). Both uses involve investigatory and reporting phases.
A. Fact-Finding as a Form of ADR
When conducted to resolve a dispute between two or more
identifiable disputants, fact-finding is a form of ADR; however, fact-
finding's investigatory phase distinguishes it from better known ADR
processes. Rather than passively hear the various disputants' version
of the facts, as do mediators and arbitrators, 130 the fact finder
conducts an investigation, proactively exploring the facts and the
nature of a dispute. 131  Investigation may involve systematic
observation, examination, and questioning. In addition to using an
independent investigation and materials submitted by the parties, the
fact finder may hold hearings, a practice more common in labor
disputes. In this context, fact-finding is similar to typical mediation
and nonbinding arbitration, both of which have hearing components.
The investigation phase is merely the gathering of information
that, if reported at all, does not contain conclusions. The fact finder
makes conclusions in the reporting phase of the process. The report
may also contain a description of the investigatory process. In the
reporting phase, conclusions are separate from recommendations. In
its most basic form, fact-finding separates the functions of defining or
clarifying the nature of the problem from developing a solution. The
typical fact finder report simply states the fact finder's conclusions as
to the nature of the problem without offering recommendations. In the
context of labor disputes, where the process is perhaps best known
and institutionalized, there are variations of fact-finding in which the
fact finder also makes recommendations concerning settlement.
132
settle their dispute. At times, this decision is treated as final. Similar or equivalent to
an arbitration if the expert relies on the parties to present evidence and arguments.
Id. at 174 (citation omitted).
130. Arbitrators can be inquisitorial and active in the pursuit of the facts, visiting a
construction site in which the dispute arose, for example; however, the more common practice is
to allow the parties to present the evidence. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, R. 35 (2000) (providing for inspection and investigation by
an arbitrator).
131. An investigation is an "[e]xploration of the facts and nature of a dispute or situation. [It
m]ay involve systematic observation, examination, and questioning. Although used
interchangeably with inquiry, . . . [an] investigation is merely the gathering of information that,
if reported at all, does not contain conclusions." DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra
note 127, at 236.
132. Thus, the following legal definition: "An investigation of a dispute by a public or private
body that examines the issues and facts in a case and may or may not recommend settlement
procedures." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-302(2.1) (West 2002). This kind of fact-finding is
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In international law, fact-finding is institutionalized as the
process of "inquiry."133 In this context, and unlike fact-finding in labor
disputes, fact-finding is concerned only with ascertaining the facts and
does not include the making of recommendations; 134 however, in an
"enlarged inquiry," a finding of facts is accompanied by
recommendations or conclusions of law.
135
When fact-finding is used as a form of ADR, the fact finder
typically is appointed jointly by disputants. This is called "joint fact-
finding,"' 36 an ad hoc private and voluntary process, in which the
nature and effect of the process and report are shaped by the parties'
agreement. Although the parties can agree to make a fact-finding
report public, the report is typically for the parties' use only.
Disputants might agree before or after the report to be bound by the
conclusions, to use it as a basis for settlement, or to move to another
dispute resolution process.
particularly common in public sector employment disputes, in which the fact finder, often a
board or panel, recommends a resolution for each outstanding issue. An additional benefit of
fact-finding in this context is that it prohibits changes in the status quo until the fact finder has
had an opportunity to investigate and report. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note
127, at 179. Some statutes require "interest" disputes to be submitted to a fact finder who issues
recommendations either as a final stage in a series of processes or in advance of compulsory
arbitration. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14 (C)(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1990). See generally
Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Emily DeLacenserie, Interest Criteria in Fact-Finding and Arbitration:
Evidentiary and Substantive Considerations, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 399 (1991) (focusing on selected
evidentiary and substantive issues that may arise in fact-finding or arbitration of interest
disputes in the public sector (e.g., client's ability to pay, ex parte consideration of evidence by
neutrals, focus/function/scope of the interest neutral) and proposing policy recommendations for
a successful fact-finding and arbitration process).
133. Fact-finding is not listed specifically with the different steps for pacific settlement in the
U.N. CHARTER art. 33. In fact, only the word "enquiry" appears as a step between negotiation
and mediation.
134. This process is consistent with the limits on inquiry defined in articles 9-36 of the
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 187
Consol. TS 410, as amended, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 205 Consol. TS 233. Some treaties
contemplate inquiry conducted jointly by officials of the disputing states rather than by an
independent third party. U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK ON THE PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES 29 (1992).
135. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 127, at 221.
136. Id. at 180 (defining "fact-finding board" and "fact-finding panel" and asserting that in
civil disputes, the parties may try to avoid impasse in negotiations by engaging a neutral,
mutually selected expert to make determinations on contested facts). See generally Donald Lee
Rome, Resolving Business Disputes: Fact-Finding and Impasse, 55 DISP. RESOL. J. 8 (2001)
(examining the nature and goals of fact-oriented resolutions, compromise without fact-finding,
fact-finding to break impasse, fact-finding as a flexible process, business considerations in a
mediation impasse, and opportunities and pitfalls of fact-finding). The term is also used in public
policy dispute resolution in which "facilitators often encourage the stakeholders to jointly gather
and determine the salient facts. In some cases, the parties will designate representatives to work
together to develop responses to factual questions relevant to a controversy." DICTIONARY OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 127, at 180.
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A court or governmental body may be empowered by statute,
regulation, or court rule to impose fact-finding on disputants.
137
Although rare as a form of court-connected ADR, mandated fact-
finding is not uncommon in public labor disputes.138 The appointing
body usually selects the fact finder and limits the scope of the
investigation and determination to particular areas in which the facts
are controverted, often in highly technical areas. 139 The report would
not be binding; however, the unique feature of the imposed fact-
finding process in labor disputes is that the recommendations of the
fact finder are usually made public under the rationale that public
opinion will make the recommendations more difficult to reject.
1 40
B. Fact-Finding as Self-Critical Analysis /Internal Investigation
In addition to its use as a form of ADR, fact-finding can occur
in the absence of identifiable disputants. An organization can initiate
fact-finding unilaterally simply to determine the facts of a situation
and to respond to or correct it accordingly. In the private sector, a
corporation might unilaterally engage a fact finder to investigate a
complaint or problem internal to the organization. This type of fact-
finding is a form of self-critical analysis ("SCA"), which is more often
conducted as an "internal investigation"'' by selected board members
137. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-201 (Michie 1999) (encouraging the use of fact-finding
in civil disputes); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3548.1, 3591 (West 1995) (discussing fact-finding as
impasse procedure for disputes involving employees in public education and higher education
respectively); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-22-301 to 13-22-313 (West 2002) (addressing court-
connected ADR processes); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-549n (West 1991) (empowering courts to
appoint fact finders in certain contract actions).
138. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3548.1, 3591 (West 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14
(C)(3) (West 1990) (discussing fact-finding in collective bargaining).
139. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 127, at 179 (mandating that the fact
finder not resolve policy issues and citing 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 App. (1993) and WIS. STAT. ANN. §
111.70(4) (West 1996)).
140. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101.801, 1101.802(2) (2001); OR. REV. STAT. §
243.722(3) (1993).
141. See Michael P. Kenny & William R. Mitchelson, Corporate Benefits of Properly
Conducted Internal Investigations, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 658 (1995) ("[Mlore and more
corporations in one form or another are utilizing internal investigations to investigate potential
wrongdoing by employees, including, in some instances, senior management."). This Article does
not cover the detailed recommended practices for internal investigations, which, although useful
for the PIFF process, do not help define it or the fundamental principles of that practice. See
generally id. For more on internal investigations, see generally Gregory J. Wallance, Internal
Investigations and Document Destruction Policies After Enron, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, at
639 (PLI Corp. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1218, 2002) (providing a list of questions
counsel should ask itself as they perform internal investigations or oversee document
destruction); Raymond C. Marshall, Conducting Internal Investigations-What to Do and Not to
Do, A.L.I.-A.B.A., Nov. 8, 2001, at 25 (suggesting efficient/effective method for conduction
internal investigations); Joseph McLaughlin & J. Kevin McCarthy, Corporate Internal
Investigations-Legal Privileges and Ethical Issues in the Employment Law Context, A.L.I..
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or committees, internal staff, ombudsmen, general counsel, outside
counsel, or accountancies and which is implicitly encouraged by
emerging legal trends.142 Much like ADR fact-finding, the value of
SCA fact-finding depends on the thoroughness of the investigation, the
accuracy of the report, and the perceived validity of the process by the
affected corporate constituents.1
43
Unlike the situation with ADR fact-finding, thoroughness,
accuracy, and validity may be difficult to achieve without an "other
side" monitoring the process to keep it "honest." In the absence of
adversarial balance 144 or of an outside oversight body, this process is
particularly open to abuse and manipulation. Ideally, a thorough
investigation, conducted free from interference, would yield optimal
self-critical analysis and best serve the interests of all those affected,
including the hiring corporate constituency; however, revelation of the
"true facts" might undermine or embarrass the corporation or the
hiring constituency, causing it to interfere in the investigation or to
squelch the report. Interference could take the form of limiting the
fact finder's access to information, the resources made available to
conduct a thorough investigation, or the scope of the investigation
itself. In response to a potentially damaging report, the hiring
constituency could bury the report or truncate and end the
investigation simply by reassigning an employee engaged in the
process or by terminating the engagement of an outside contractor. A
public historical example of the latter is Richard Nixon's firing of
A.B.A., July 23, 1998, at 991 (examining work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege
when attorneys perform internal investigations); Joel W. Sternman & Emily Eiselman, Advising
the Directors: Minimizing the Risk of Litigation Through Internal Investigations by Special
Counsel, A.L.I.-A.B.A., May 28, 1992, reprinted in THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (1992).
142. See Kenny & Mitchelson, supra note 141, at 659-60 (describing the trend toward
leniency in corporate criminal prosecutions if a corporation conducts an internal investigation
and engages in whistle-blowing); see also Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 110, at 961 n.55
(noting the effect on the sentencing guidelines multiplier); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8C2.5() (1994); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as
a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 607-
08 (1995) (proposing that an effective compliance program be a defense to corporate criminal
liability, not just a mitigating factor); Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding
Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 BUS. LAW. 617, 657-59 (1994) (explaining that the
implemented compliance program must be effective in preventing and detecting criminal
conduct).
143. Despite the internal nature of this form of fact-finding, more likely than not the process
is stimulated by some external or internal controversy over the underlying facts. There may be
competing internal corporate constituents whose interests could be adversely affected by the
outcome. In short, there are potential disputants; however, the process is controlled by the
directors, CEO, or other corporate managers who initiated it.
144. In joint fact-finding, the disputing parties presumably create the checks necessary to
keep the process honest. Otherwise, they are free to abandon it.
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Archibald Cox, to which one of the political reactions was the creation
of the Office of Independent Counsel.
145
C. Independent Fact-Finding
The thoroughness, accuracy, and validity of fact-finding can
only be assured if the process and the fact finder are independent.
Fact-finding is independent when the corporation and its internal
constituencies relinquish control over the process to a fact finder who
is impartial and impervious to manipulation. The principle of
independence applies to both the process and the person. With respect
to the independence of the process, there are issues of scope, access,
and resources. Scope refers to the breadth of the problem to be
investigated. Although an overbroad statement of the problem in the
fact finder's engagement agreement could cause a problem, a too-
narrowly defined scope may unduly hamper the fact finder's ability to
get to the root of the problem. Access refers to the availability of
information to the fact finder, including key people and documents.
Resources refer to the time, money, and expert personnel available to
the fact finder.
With respect to the independence of the person, there are
issues of selection, conflicts of interest, and termination, all of which
relate to how much influence the corporation or its various
constituents may have over the fact finder. Independence in selection
implies that the selection process is arm's length and that the fact
finder did not directly solicit the engagement. The corporation should
not be free to hire a fact finder it believes would be uncritical and
biased in its favor. A fact finder should be free of any conflicts of
interest which may influence the investigation or the conclusions in
the report. Independence may result in a more thorough investigation
because people who might otherwise fear retaliation from other
corporate constituents will be more willing to talk to someone who
does not answer to those corporate constituents and who can assure
them some degree of confidentiality. Finally, a fact finder cannot be
independent if the corporation or any of its constituents are capable of
terminating the engagement at any time. By extension, an
independent fact finder cannot be a member of the corporate
145. Independent Counsel Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (1993) (lapsed in 1999). During
the Watergate scandal, Cox was appointed as special prosecutor, and Nixon fired him in what
became known as the "Saturday Night Massacre." Elliot Richardson, The Saturday Night




constituency or have a stake in any continuing relationship with the
corporation. 146
D. Public Independent Fact-Finding
If the purpose of the independent fact-finding is limited to self-
critical analysis, then it is an internal investigation, the sole purpose
of which is to help those in charge better understand what has
occurred or is occurring. As such, it may be an excellent diagnostic
tool, but it does not address a legitimacy crisis or the public trust
problem. The report is private or limited only to management or the
directors of the corporation. In some cases, it may be in the
corporation's interest to keep the report confidential, as when the
content may be embarrassing or may reveal illegal acts or other
behavior that exposes the corporation to liability. During a corporate
social legitimacy crisis, however, public dissemination of the report
can provide support for the assertions of the apologia. At this point,
independent fact-finding becomes public independent fact-finding
("PIFF') and is capable of addressing the public trust problem.
1. Examples of PIFF
PIFF is not new, particularly in the context of incidents that
jeopardize public trust in government. A relatively contemporary
example is the Warren Commission formed to investigate and report
on the Kennedy assassination. 147 The trend of its use in response to
corporate social legitimacy crises might be traced to former Attorney
General Griffin Bell's investigation and report in the wake of the E.F.
Hutton scandal. 148 In its eighty-three years of existence, E.F. Hutton
had become one of Wall Street's most formidable giants, with annual
146. In the post-Enron era, there is increased pressure on state courts to demonstrate that
they can oversee corporate governance without the need for federalization beyond the initial
steps of Sarbanes-Oxley. Higher scrutiny of who is truly independent in the context of special
investigations is already manifesting itself in recent decisions. See, e.g., In re Oracle, 2003 WL
21396449 (Del. Ch. 2003); Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003); HealthSouth
Independent Probe Had Gaps, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2003, at Cl; see also Sternman & Eiselman,
supra note 141, at 9 (recommending use of outside special counsel rather than any corporate
employees or regular outside counsel).
147. See generally THE OFFICIAL WARREN COMMISSION REPORT ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT KENNEDY (Louis Nizer ed., 1964) (chaired by Chief Justice Earl Warren). Although
such commissions are usually ad hoc, the role of "inspector general" within the government is an
example of an institutionalized, fact-finding mechanism. See Michael R. Bromwich, Running
Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2028 (1998)
148. See Steps in the Hutton Scandal: A Chronology, AM. BANKER, Sept. 6, 1985, at 8; E.F.
Hutton's Simmering Scandal: More and More Questions Are Raised About the Investment Firm,
TIME, July 22, 1985, at 53, available at 1985 WL 2367489.
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revenues of nearly $3 billion and 18,000 employees in 400 offices
around the United States. 149 Its powerful television slogan 150-"When
E.F. Hutton talks, people listen"-made the brokerage house a
household name; however, it faced a social legitimacy crisis upon the
discovery of a check-kiting scheme in the early 1980s. In May 1985, as
a part of its settlement with the Department of Justice, Hutton agreed
to pay $2.75 million in fines and to set aside $8 million for restitution
to banks victimized in the overdraft scheme. In response to this
settlement, Hutton officials asked former United States Attorney
General Griffin Bell, then a partner in the Atlanta law firm of King
and Spalding, to investigate and to determine the cause, to identify
who in the company should be held accountable for the scheme, and to
recommend control measures. 151  This investigation led to the
publication of a report in September, 1985, which called for the
discipline of a number of Hutton employees.' 5
2
In 1996, thirty female current and former employees and the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") accused
Mitsubishi Motors Manufacturing of America of allowing widespread
sexual harassment. 153 Mitsubishi's initial reaction, protesting the
claims, triggered a corporate social legitimacy crisis. In addition to
intense media scrutiny, Mitsubishi faced boycotts by the
Rainbow/PUSH Coalition and the National Organization for
Women.' 54 The Congressional Women's Caucus called for greater
EEOC spending to investigate the case and warned the auto company
to end its alleged "retaliation" against women employees. 55
Mitsubishi hired a crisis communications firm, 156 which contracted
former Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin to investigate working
conditions in the Normal, Illinois plant. Martin issued her public
report in February 1997, making thirty-four wide-ranging
149. Irwin Ross, Inside the Hutton Debacle, FORTUNE, Aug. 28, 1989, at 127.
150. The commercials featured the face and voice of the late John Houseman who ironically
played fictional Harvard Law Professor Kingsfield, a character of undoubted intelligence and
integrity, in the movie and television series The Paper Chase.
151. The result of the investigation was the "Hutton Report." See Pearce v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.D.C. 1987).
152. See id.
153. See EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1068 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
154. David Southwell, Jackson, NOW Push on with Mitsubishi Boycott, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July
24, 1996, at 20, available at 1996 WL 6755993.
155. See Press Release, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congressman Norton
Condemns Retaliatory Actions by Mitsubishi, May 2, 1996, at http://www.house.gov/norton/-
may2.htm.
156. The role of the firm is described on its website. See Manning, Selvage & Lee, at
http://www.mslprdc.com/cc/cc-mitsu.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
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recommendations for Mitsubishi to improve its workplace
environment. 157
In 1997, Nike faced a barrage of accusations regarding its labor
practices, or the labor practices of its suppliers, in Southeast Asia. 158
Although Nike had developed one of the first codes of conduct
governing labor relations in its industry, reports of sweatshop
conditions and substandard wages precipitated a corporate social
legitimacy crisis. 159 Nike asked civil rights advocate and former U.N.
Ambassador Andrew Young, a nonlawyer, to provide Nike
management with an independent evaluation of its code of conduct
and its application at the factory level and to make specific
suggestions on how to apply it more effectively and possibly how to
enhance it.160 Young conducted an investigation, toured factories, and
issued a report containing a number of findings and recommendations
about Nike's code.
161
In 1999, the entire Olympic organization was faced with a
social legitimacy crisis arising from allegations of bribery. The Salt
Lake Organizing Committee ("SLOC") was accused of providing
$400,000 in scholarships to families of IOC members along with skis,
custom shotguns, free medical care, and other lavish gifts in its efforts
to secure its bid as host city for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. 162 So
as not to be tainted with the scandal, major sponsors were threatening
to withdraw their support. 163 In response, the United States Olympic
Committee ("USOC") engaged former Senator and Majority Leader
George Mitchell, a lawyer with the Washington, D.C., law firm of
Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, to head a special
investigation commission. 164 His report led to the dismissal of a USOC
157. Thane Peterson, Mitsubishi Gets Its Report Card, BUS. WK., available at
http://www.businessweek.co.za/1997/O8/b351572.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
158. Brad Knickerbocker, Nike Fights Full Court Press on Labor Issue, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 23, 1997.
159. For Code of Conduct, see Nike, Nike's Commitment is to Provide Workers Making Our
Products with the Best Possible, at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&-
cat=compliance.
160. Matthew Quinn, Young to Study Nike Policies on Sweatshops, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Feb. 25, 1997, at C1.
161. The Young's Report is located on-line, Andrew Young, Andrew Young's Report,
NIKEWORKERS.COM, at http://www.rpi.edu/-huntklnikeworkers/ay.html.
162. See Carol Morello, Some Sponsors Say They Feel "Victimized', USA TODAY SPORTS, Dec.
17, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5745020.
163. Games Corporate Sponsors Await Findings of Inquiries, USA TODAY SPORTS, Dec. 21,
1998, 1998 WL 5745329.
164. The committee is titled "Special Olympic Bid Oversight Commission." See USOC Panel
Issues Report on Olympic Reforms, CNN.COM, Mar. 1, 1999, at http://www.cnn.comUS/9903/O1/-
olympics.01 (last visited Mar. 31, 2003). Commission members also included former White
House Chief of Staff Ken Duberstein and baseball union chief Donald Fehr, Roberta Cooper
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employee and various reforms. 165 This example illustrates PIFF in
not-for-profit organizations, which also can suffer from social
legitimacy crises.
As noted earlier, government agencies also experience
legitimacy crises. After its conduct in the standoff with the Branch
Davidians at their compound in Waco, Texas, the FBI faced questions
about its conduct-in particular accusations that it had caused the fire
that killed many members of the sect and that it had engaged in a
cover-up. By special order, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed
former Senator John Danforth, a lawyer with the Saint Louis firm of
Bryan Cave, as special counsel to investigate and report on whether
any government employee was responsible for the deaths, withheld
evidence, or made fraudulent statements about the events of April 19,
1993.166 Danforth's final report was sharply critical of some members
of the Justice Department's trial team and two FBI agents but
otherwise absolved the government from the alleged acts.
167
In the wake of the Enron scandal, Enron's auditor, Arthur
Andersen, faced accusations of destroying audit documents that would
have revealed its complicity in Enron's misleading accounting
tactics. 168 Andersen hired Danforth, along with former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, to examine its document handling
policies and potential conflicts between its auditing and counseling
businesses. 169
Other than uncovering the facts and providing useful
recommendations as any internal investigation should do, does PIFF
work? We are unaware of any method of precisely gauging the effect of
such an intervention on the public's perception of the organization's
legitimacy. Although E.F. Hutton continued to struggle and was
eventually subsumed in mergers with Shearson and Lehman
Brothers, the efficacy of Judge Bell's PIFF cannot be judged by
Hutton's demise when one considers all the other possible causal
Ramo, past president of the American Bar Association, and Jeff Benz, a lawyer and member of
the USOC's athletes council. See id.
165. See id.
166. Attorney General Order 2256-99, pursuant to the Attorney General's authority under 28
U.S.C. §§ 509-510 (2000).
167. See JOHN C. DANFORTH, SPECIAL COUNSEL, FINAL REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL: CONCERNING THE 1993 CONFRONTATION AT THE MOUNT CARMEL COMPLEX, WACO,
TEXAS (Nov. 8, 2000) (pursuant to special order 2256-99).
168. David Hilzewrath, Data Destruction Intensifies Andersen's Woes, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
2002, at E01, available at 2002 WL 2520305.
169. Id. (Danforth); David Hilzewrath & Jackie Spines, Andersen Recasting Its Image;
Volcker to Lead Reform Effort, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 10945793.
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factors. 170 Hutton engaged Bell too late, after much of the damage had
already been done. Perhaps its other efforts at managing the crisis
were insufficient or perhaps public trust was so fundamental to
Hutton's business that it may have sustained a self-inflicted mortal
wound from the onset,171 as was the case with Arthur Andersen,
whose narrowly defined engagement of Danforth and Volcker was too
little, too late. 172 Conversely, Young's PIFF cannot be credited directly
for Nike's continued success-however, in spite of some criticism of
Young's efforts, 173 accusations of exploitive labor practices have
largely dissipated. Danforth's Waco report also received predictable
criticism from groups that benefit from public mistrust of the
government, 174 but, for the most part, the public's interest has moved
on from the episode. 175 In the Mitsubishi example, the company's
response to Martin's report helped end the boycotts and settle the suit
with the EEOC.176 In the case of the Salt Lake City Olympic bribery,
the 2002 Winter Olympics took place, and the USOC, along with the
Olympic organization in general, seem to have saved their sponsors.
Although it is difficult to assess Mitchell's role in the overall recovery,
his intervention did have a considerable effect on ending the
legitimacy crisis. The media shifted its focus from questioning the
170. Numerous federal and state agencies pursued Hutton after the first settlement,
arguably weakening it to the point that it was forced to merge. See COMM. ON FED. REGULATION
OF SEC., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SEC SETTLEMENTS OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL LITIGATION AND SEC ENFORCEMENT, MATTER OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW
(1991), reprinted in 47 BUS. LAWYER 1083 (1992) (submitted for discussion by Harvey L. Pitt).
171. JOE MARCONI, CRISIS MARKETING: WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD COMPANIES
203, 205-06 (2d ed. 1997) (observing that Hutton marketed poorly and failed to respond to the
crisis with enough force).
172. See Crisis, What Crisis?, supra note 115, at 20 (noting the opinion of Clifford Nichols
that "the problem with Andersen is that the Enron crisis hit its core competency, its essence of
professional trust"). Andersen failed to give Danforth and Volcker a broad enough charge early
enough to convince the public to give the process a chance. Meanwhile, the Department of
Justice acted with uncharacteristic speed and force to prosecute the firm, thereby preempting the
fact-finding process.
173. Global Exchange, a San Francisco-based human rights group, criticized Young's report
as misleading. See Tina Cassidy, Can't Just Do It Anymore; Nike's Recent Success TIrns
Spotlight on Firm-For Better or Worse, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1997, at F1 (quoting Global
Exchange's president as saying that Nike "bought off Andrew Young"). For Nike's and Young's
handling of anticipated criticisms, see infra note 187 and accompanying text.
174. The libertarian Cato Institute criticized Danforth's Waco Report. See Timothy Lynch,
No Confidence: An Unofficial Account of the Waco Incident, in CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 395
(2001).
175. The Justice Department and the FBI are now concerned with a legitimacy crisis arising
from perceived intelligence failures and subsequent mishandling of 9/11-related activities.
176. Although self-serving, the crisis management consultants deemed the effort successful.
See Manning, Selvage & Lee, supra note 156.
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credibility of the USOC to tracking Mitchell's efforts. Ultimately, his
report was accepted as dispositive.
At a minimum, these organizations benefited from the
intercession of a publicly trusted person. This conclusion is purely
speculative, but interpersonal trust of a natural person, even if based
solely on reputation, seems easier to extend than institutional trust.177
The process had the best chance of success when it was implemented
as soon as the crisis became evident and before the public had taken a
position. 178 The process was more efficient and, with the exception of
Andersen, faster than the courts in uncovering the facts that were
sought. Additionally, if the public was convinced to give the process a
chance and perceived both that the organization was willing to engage
in a public process of self-analysis 179 and that the process successfully
revealed all to the public, the effort essentially inoculated the
organization from further media attack. This reprieve gave the
organization enough breathing room to address the problem. As one
authority on corporate crises notes, after Bell's report for E.F. Hutton
had made everything public the media quickly lost interest because
the situation was "stripped of newsworthiness." 180
2. Publicness in PIFF
This characteristic of "publicness" distinguishes PIFF from
other independent fact-finding. Unlike fact-finding as ADR, which is a
dispute resolution mechanism, and fact-finding as self-critical
analysis, which is primarily an internal truth-finding mechanism,
PIFF also functions as a public trust-generating mechanism that
validates the corporation's apologia. 81  For PIFF to function
177. Arguably, the effectiveness of Chrysler's apologia was directly related to the public's
trust in its chairman Lee Iacocca, who had developed a strong reputation and issued the apologia
personally.
178. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 110, at 965-66:
"If you aren't geared up and ready to inform the public," one corporate spokesperson
noted, "you will be judged guilty until proven innocent."... Companies that withdraw
into a cocoon at this stage are making a grave mistake. Reporters facing tight
deadlines will inevitably look to alternate sources for their information.
(citation omitted).
179. By merely engaging in PIFF, the organization reinforces the positive rhetoric of its
apologia by communicating to the public that the organization values the truth and is willing to
bear the consequences and act to correct and prevent.
180. COOMBS, supra note 83, at 142.
181. Of course, PIFF may not validate the previous assertions of the corporation. The
corporation must communicate a reaction to the report.
In addition to the general public, "public" includes any corporate constituency, internal or
external, other than management, who might be the intended audience and whose trust is
essential for the organization's continued well-being. Presumably, the PIFF also serves the same
internal corporate purposes as an internal investigation.
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successfully as a trust-generating mechanism, both the process and
the person conducting it must obtain the public trust. For the process
and the person to be perceived by the public as trustworthy, they must
be independent for many of the same reasons discussed above, but
that independence also must be transparent. For those relying upon
the fact finder's report, the perception of independence is as important
as actual independence.1 8 2 If the public is relying upon the report, all
indices of independence must be public and must withstand public
scrutiny.
As a process, however, PIFF has received little public scrutiny
because its use has been ad hoc and relatively rare. Lacking an
institutional framework of well-established procedures and standards
to guarantee independence and thoroughness and enough of a track
record to establish a reputation as a reliable trust-generating
institution, PIFF's effectiveness rests almost solely on the public
reputation of the fact finder. For this reason, PIFF has been conducted
by public figures, some of whom are prominent lawyers, who enjoy a
reputation for competence, objectivity, and integrity. Generally,
independent fact-finding does not require public figures. Although
many of these public figures are especially adept at handling the press
and communicating with the public, fact-finding requires no special
skills and characteristics other than good investigative and analytical
abilities, competence, and independence. Because the public
independent fact finder is operating in an atmosphere of distrust, the
fact finder also must have the skill to conduct the process beyond
reproach and without the slightest appearance of impropriety.
Although lawyers are particularly suited by training and experience to
conduct such a process, many nonlawyers are equally capable.
Similarly, there are many capable people with the requisite level of
integrity but who lack a public reputation for it. Because high-profile
problems such as a giant multinational corporation's social legitimacy
crisis may inevitably require the intervention of high-profile
individuals, by hiring a reputable public figure to conduct the fact-
finding, the beleaguered organization is probably hoping for some
"halo" effect similar to celebrity endorsement of its products.
Nevertheless, the PIFF process has the potential to be a trust-
generating institution without relying solely on reputable public
figures. Until better institutionalized, however, the public's response
182. Fair procedures promote trust in the decisionmaker and acceptance of the outcome, not
because they achieve a more advantageous outcome, but instead because people evaluate the
outcome through a "fairness heuristic" that judges the outcome based on perceived aspects of
procedural fairness in how the decision was reached. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R.
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
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to the fact finder's report is far more dependent on the reputation of
the person than that of the process.
V. THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONALIZATION
For the fact finder and the corporation in crisis,
overdependence on personal reputation is a risky proposition.
Although it is axiomatic that public institutions are dependent on
public trust to function, public independent fact finders are equally
dependent on the public trust to function effectively. Each time they
conduct a PIFF, they put their own credibility on the line. Without
established and publicly accepted structures, standards, practices, and
procedures by which the public can gauge the credibility of the
process, fact finders risk being accused of merely trading on their good
name. Such an accusation could destroy a fact finder's reputation
unless the process was transparent in its integrity. Moreover, the
destruction of public figures' reputations undermines the value of
reputation in society as a public good.183
In turn, the corporation risks an even deeper crisis if it is
perceived as merely trying to achieve a halo effect without a sincere
interest in getting to the root of the problem. In an interview with the
New York Times, Edwin H. Stier, a lawyer who specializes in
independent investigations, noted that:
[A beleaguered corporation's] first inclination from a public relations standpoint is to
hire somebody whose credibility will convince the public that in and of itself the
conclusion they reach is the right conclusion .... However, the public has got to be
reassured that the process you went through is one that is effective at getting the
bottom-line information you need. If you take the position that "we'll let you know what
the results are but we're not going to tell you how we got there," then you run into a
serious risk that the whole effort will backfire.
18 4
This risk materialized when Mattel, Inc. hired Gary G. Lynch,
the former director of enforcement for the Securities and Exchange
Commission who had brought cases against prominent traders like
Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky, to investigate accusations that
Mattel had overstated its earnings. Mattel left itself open to continued
criticism by stating that Lynch had uncovered no wrongdoing on the
part of company executives but refusing to release his report.185
More importantly, corporations that abuse the process and
public figures who merely sell their reputation to "whitewash" socially
irresponsible corporations undermine the integrity of a promising but
poorly institutionalized fact-finding process. What little public
183. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.




scrutiny PIFF has received reflects cynicism and questions the
integrity of the process. 8 6 This reaction places public independent fact
finders on the defensive without the protective framework of an
institutionalized process.187 Arguably, this fatal flaw eroded support
for the Office of Independent Counsel. 88 In addition to improving
public trust in PIFF, thereby making its effectiveness less dependent
on the public trust in the fact finder, better institutionalization will
protect the fact finder's reputation and the long-term utility of the
process.
A. Institutionalizing Public Independent Fact-Finding
In the previous sections, we have attempted to show that, when
PIFF exhibits the requisite fundamental characteristics of
independence and publicness, it has the potential to generate trust
and may be particularly useful when other trust-generating
institutions are being questioned or fail to address the problem. We
have argued that the process, the fact finder, and the corporation in
crisis are best served by establishing PIFF as a trust-generating
institution with the structures necessary to guarantee independence
and publicness.
186. Id.; see also Liza Kaufman, Credibility for Hire? Griffin Bell, Tapped for Implant Probe,
Draws Fire, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at 1; Blessed by Paul: Paul Volcker and Other Corporate
Cleanup Men, SLATE, Feb. 4, 2002 (noting that Arthur Andersen hired former Federal Reserve
Board Chairman, Paul Volcker, Jr., to monitor the company's accounting practices, and quoting
Volcker as saying, "'The reason I got involved is that Andersen is in big trouble and they were
looking for someone to sprinkle holy water on them.' '), at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2061633 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2003); David Plotz, Former Sen. John Danforth: Why is "St. Jack" Helping Arthur
Andersen?, SLATE, Jan. 18, 2002 (describing the engagement as one in which "Andersen basks in
the reflected glory of St. Jack" and asserting that "Andersen approached Danforth because they
know he will give the company a nice scrubbing. Andersen wants Danforth to make dozens of
recommendations for document handling, and then to walk away, leaving the world with the
impression that St. Jack has given Andersen a gold stamp"), at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2060848
(last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
187. For example, Andrew Young felt obliged to answer critics directly in a section of his
report entitled, "The Credibility of This Report." See Young, supra note 161. Nike even created a
website to respond to specific criticisms. See Frequently Asked Questions: Working Conditions in
Nike Subcontract Factories, NIKEWORKERS.COM, at http://www.rpi.edu/-huntk/nikeworkers/-
faq-wc.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
188. No institution had a duty or inclination to defend independent counsels when they were
attacked in the public arena. See Abraham Dash, The Office of Independent Counsel and the
Fatal Flaw: "They are Left to Twist in the Wind, " 60 MD. L. REV. 26, 27 (2001).
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Assuming that institutionalizing18 9 PIFF is a good idea, what
are the best procedures and standards of practice that will ensure the
requisite independence and publicness, which allow the public to
gauge the credibility of the process? In short, how should these
procedures and standards be institutionalized to earn and deserve the
public trust?190 The American Arbitration Association's ("AAA") effort
to institutionalize fact-finding provides us with a model to examine
possible responses to this question.
B. The AAA's Fact-Finding Model
The AAA launched its new Independent Fact-Finding Service
("IFFS") in 2002 on the heels of the recent rash of corporate crises. 91
Emphasizing accuracy, speed, and credibility, the IFFS provides a
range of ADR and SCA fact-finding services, including those for
private internal investigations by business and not-for-profit
corporations and in aid of judicial and administrative processes.
92
However, the primary thrust seems to be to promote the use of
PIFF.193 According to the AAA's promotional materials, the IFFS is a
189. Institutionalization refers to "the extent to which there are well-known, regularized,
readily available mechanisms, techniques or procedures for dealing with a problem." Richard E.
Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L.
& SOcY REV. 525, 563 (1980-81). It includes, but is not limited to, the following: policies, laws,
procedures, and practices embedded in social and organizational systems and culture of society
to integrate conflict prevention and resolution in an organization, the process by which conflict
prevention and resolution become part of the organizational identity, and absorption, adoption,
or melding of conflict prevention or resolution activities into an organization or policy.
190. The progress of mediation's institutionalization over the last twenty-five years may
provide some insight. Although some efforts to institutionalize mediation started in the 1970s,
mediation emerged out of its status as a cottage industry when businesses and courts recognized
its potential to reduce the costs of disputing and to manage overloaded dockets. In the private
sector, for-profit and not-for-profit organizations formed to provide mediation services. These
organizations developed procedural rules that governed the conduct of the process. Mediators
formed professional organizations and adopted codes of conduct. In the public sector, courts and
legislatures established mediation programs and provided rules for the process and standards for
mediators.
191. On June 4th 2002, the American Arbitration Association announced its new
Independent Fact Finding Services--. Press Release, Am. Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Announces
Launch of New Independent Fact-Finding Services and Panel; Independent Investigation for
Organizations Facing Crisis (June 4, 2002) [hereinafter AAA Press Release], reprinted in Bus.
WIRE, June 4, 2002, Westlaw, All New Plus Wires.
192. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Draft Promotional Brochure (on file with authors). For
business corporations, the service is depicted as a method through which senior management,
directors, trustees, and general counsel might better fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities by
providing accurate, credible information to various interest groups. It is being marketed to courts
and regulatory agencies to assist in the deliberative processes of those entities; however, to the
extent fact-finding for a court or regulatory agency is not directly tied to the problem of restoring
public trust, it is irrelevant to our analysis.
193. The AAA Press Release states:
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credible response to an assault on public trust, institutional goodwill,
brands, and corporate reputation and provides "an impartial, objective
investigation in emerging crisis situations."'194 As an institutional
infrastructure for the process, 195 the AAA, a private, not-for-profit
corporation, has administrative experience and capacity in delivering
arbitration, mediation, election monitoring, and other dispute-
handling services.1
96
Although the IFFS is a nascent work-in-progress, the initial set
of rudimentary procedures is designed to protect the independence of
both the fact finder and the process. 197 In much the same way the
AAA preserves the appearance of arbitrator and mediator impartiality
by insulating them from ex parte contact with the parties, the rules
require that the potential user approach the AAA first. 198 Then, the
AAA prequalifies a list of fact finders for the particular engagement,
checking for potential conflicts of interest, suitable expertise, and
availability. 199 The "client" chooses a fact finder from the list of
prequalified members of the panel.200 The engagement agreement
between the client and the fact finder establishes the scope of the
investigation and any additional procedures consistent with the IFFS
"It is an honor for me to be a part of such a unique and credible service offering, and to
be involved with an organization grounded in integrity and impartiality," said Judge
William Webster. "AAA's Fact-Finding Services gives business and service entities a
socially responsible option for fulfilling the public's deserved demand for
accountability in the midst of controversial situations." William K. Slate II, President
and CEO, American Arbitration Association added "AAA's oversight of the integrity
and independence of the process, combined with the depth and breadth of the
panelists' professional accomplishments and experience, provide unmatched benefits
to organizations and enterprises that seek to sustain public trust and institutional
goodwill through the work of independent investigative teams."
AAA Press Release, supra note 191.
194. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, AAA INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING SERVICES (promotional
brochure) [hereinafter AAA IFFS PROMOTIONAL BROCHURE], available at
http://adr.org/upload/LIVESITE/focusArea/Fact-Finding/75-282_IFFSSmech.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2003)
195. We recognize that PIFF can be provided through other private and public institutional
structures, including for-profit corporations, self-regulatory organizations, courts, and
government agencies. As with other forms of fact-finding, e.g., labor and international,
institutionalization could be aided by regulation, statute, court rule, and treaty. Although these
options are all part of the institutionalization question, our focus is on the establishment of
fundamental rules and standards.
196. See AAA IFFS PROMOTIONAL BROCHURE, supra note 194.
197. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, AAA IFFS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (May 30, 2002)
[hereinafter IFFS PROCEDURES] (draft on file with authors).
198. Id. at 2.1, 2.3 (discussing contact with the AAA and requiring the AAA to determine
suitability). If the AAA determines that the investigation is suitable for the IFFS, the client and
the AAA will enter an engagement agreement incorporating the IFFS Procedures. Id. at 4.1.
199. Id. at 2.1 & 5.2.
200. Id. at 5. The client selects the fact finder from a list of three candidates provided by the
AAA or gives the AAA sole discretion to select the fact finder. See id. at 5.1(a)-(b), 5.2.
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Procedures governing the process. 20 1 It strictly limits the fact finder's
function to the conduct of the independent investigation 2 2 and
expressly proscribes the role of advocate. 20 3 The fact finder controls all
aspects of the investigation 20 4 and has the authority to contract
outside resources as needed. 20 5 If the client attempts to end the
process unilaterally, obstructs, or otherwise makes it difficult for the
fact finder to complete the process, the fact finder can terminate the
relationship and make public the reasons for doing so. 20 6  As
administrator of the program, the AAA provides a buffer and oversees
201. See id. at 6.1:
Upon the selection of the Fact-Finder, the Client and the Fact-Finder will negotiate
and execute the Fact-Finder Engagement Agreement which will contain (in addition
to standard terms incorporating IFFS policies and procedures) a detailed description
of the scope of the investigation, the anticipated scope of the Report, the identity of
the Report Recipients, and the manner in which the Fact-Finder will be compensated.
202. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, AAA IFFS CLIENT-FACT FINDER ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT
(2002) [hereinafter FACT FINDER ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT] (unpublished manuscript on file
with authors). The agreement provides:
Client acknowledges and agrees that Fact-Finder is engaged for the sole purpose of
the Engagement and for no other reason. In this regard, Fact-Finder shall not be
obligated or expected to bring to the Client's attention any matters of which Fact-
Finder or its agents become aware which are not related to the Report to be rendered
in connection with the Engagement.
Id.
203. Id.; see also IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 7.3 ('The Fact-Finder shall not act as
an advocate for the Client but shall instead conduct an independent investigation and shall
control all aspects of the investigation.").
204. IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 7.3 (control of process).
205. See FACT FINDER ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 202. Providing:
Fact-Finder shall be entitled to engage support personnel and other professionals,
including without limitation law firms, accounting firms, and other experts
(collectively, "Other Professionals") to assist Fact-Finder in connection with the
Engagement subject to prior approval by Client, which approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld. Client shall in all events be responsible for the compensation
and expenses of Other Professionals. Client approves of the Other Professionals
specified on Schedule C and agrees to the compensation arrangements for such Other
Professionals as specified thereon.
Id.; IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 6.4 ('The Fact-Finder and the Client shall be
responsible for documenting agreements with Other Professionals. Unless agreed otherwise in
writing between the Fact-Finder and the Client, the Client shall be solely responsible for
compensating the Other Professionals."); Id. at 1.8 (" 'Other Professionals' shall mean support
personnel and other professionals, independent of the Client, engaged by the Fact-Finder to
assist in the investigation, such as law firms, accountants, investment bankers, or private
investigators.").
206. See IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 8.1-8.4. If the client terminates the fact
finder's engagement, the AAA can appoint a new fact finder and the former fact finder "shall
promptly disclose to the Report Recipients the reasons for such withdrawal by the Fact-Finder or
termination by the Client and may disclose to the Report Recipients the results of the
investigation to date," unless they mutually agree otherwise. Id. at 8.2. If the client terminates
the investigation "the Fact-Finder or the AAA may disclose to the Report Recipients the results
of the investigation to date and the circumstances giving rise to the termination of the
investigation." Id. at 8.3.
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compliance with the procedures. With respect to the publicness of the
person and the process, the procedural framework to assure
independence is publicly available as are all of the AAA's rules.
Finally, the rules provide that the final report or its conclusions must
be disclosed to an independent committee of the board of directors or
trustees, the public, a court, or some other appropriate independent
body approved by the AAA.
20 7
VI. THE NEED FOR ETHICAL STANDARDS AND SOME QUANDARIES FOR
LAWYER-FACT FINDERS
The IFFS promotional materials state that the fact finder will
conduct an independent investigation "according to the highest ethical
standards";208 however, these standards have not yet been articulated.
Eventually, they will need to be. Although procedural controls on
conduct play a part, the success of a trust-generating institution also
rests on the public's perception of the integrity of the process and of
the person conducting it. The IFFS is relying heavily on the
reputations of the AAA and each member of the panel, initially
composed of prominent attorneys,20 9 "recognized by their peers for
207. See IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 7.5 ("The determination of what constitutes
another appropriate independent body' shall be determined by the AAA in its sole and absolute
discretion.")
208. AAA IFFS PROMOTIONAL BROCHURE, supra note 194, at 2.
209. The initial fifteen-person panel includes:
Arlin M. Adams, Counsel to Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis and former U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge; Dennis Archer, Chairman, Dickinson & Wright, and
former Mayor of the City of Detroit; Griffin Bell, Managing Partner, King & Spalding,
former Attorney General of the United States and former U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge; W. J. Michael Cody, Partner, Burch, Porter & Johnson and former
Attorney General of the State of Tennessee; Talbot ("Sandy") D'Alemberte, President,
The Florida State University and former President, American Bar Association (ABA);
John D. Feerick, Dean, Fordham University School of Law and former Partner,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Conrad K. Harper, Partner, Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett and former Legal Adviser for the U.S. State Department; R. William Ide
III, former Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Monsanto
Corporation and former President of the ABA; Roberta Katz, Executive Officer and
Director, Charles and Roberta Katz Family Foundation and former Senior Vice
President, Secretary and General Counsel, Netscape Communications Corporation;
Edward V. Lahey, General Counsel, Essex Boat Works and former Senior Vice
President, General Counsel and Secretary, PepsiCo; Gabrielle McDonald, IranU.S.
claims tribunal judge in the Hague and former U.S. District Court Judge; George G.
Mitchell, Partner, Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson and Hand and former U.S.
Senate Majority Leader; Roberta Cooper Ramo, Partner, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl,
Harris & Sisk and the first female president of the ABA; David B. Sandalow,
Executive Vice President, World Wildlife Fund and former Assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans, Environment and Science; William H. Webster, Senior Partner,
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, former Director of Central Intelligence and former
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
AAA Press Release, supra note 191.
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their integrity, high ethical standards, character and good judgment"
and embodying "the AAA's fundamental commitment to objectivity
and independence." 210 As reasoned above, too heavy a reliance on the
personal reputations of the fact finders is risky for the fact finders, the
institutionalization effort, and the public good. The public may trust a
fact finder based on a reputation for personal integrity and claims of
expertise to a point, but trust in the institutional framework will
better reinforce the interpersonal trust in the fact finder. Trust in the
institution of fact-finding requires the establishment of carefully
delineated expectations of practitioner behavior.211 Conformance to a
code of ethics signals to the public that practitioners define their
responsibilities based on something other than the nature of the
assigned task or than simple self-interest.
212
Currently, fact-finding is not a recognized profession, and there
is no model code of professional conduct for fact finders. What set of
ethical or professional standards apply or can provide some guidance?
Lacking anything specific, the nonlawyer-fact finder may look to the
standards applicable to their primary profession 213 or to some of the
standards applicable to neutrals. 21 4 For the lawyer-fact finder, this is
a particularly vexing question, and the answer depends on whether
the lawyer is representing the company or not. Lawyers are subject to
210. AAA IFFS PROMOTIONAL BROCHURE, supra note 194, at 3.
211. See Zucker, supra note 23, at 63-64 (explaining person or firm-specific trust).
212. By obtaining a license, earning credentials, and joining a professional association,
individuals signal their commitment to abide by applicable rules of conduct. See Dean Neu, New
Stock Issues and the Institutional Production of Trust, 16 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC'y 185, 188 (1991).
213. Nonlawyer-fact finders may be members of professions which have ethics codes that
may apply if the fact finder provides the fact-finding service ancillary to their normal
professional services. For example, accountants might offer the service as part of the panoply of
accounting services.
214. Arguably, standards applicable to neutrals would not apply because disputing parties
do not select the fact finder in SCA fact-finding to serve as their neutral, as contrasted with ADR
fact-finding. See SOC'Y FOR PROF'LS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ETHICS COMM., ETHICAL
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1986) (addressing impartiality and
confidentiality, among other issues), available at
http://www.acresolution.org/research.nsffkey/Eth-Sta (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). The parties,
however, may provide some guidance. See id. Codes for arbitrators and mediators are specific to
those disciplines but also may offer some guidance. See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS
IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n & Am. Bar Ass'n, 1977), available at
http://www.adr.org/index2. 1.jsp?JSPssid=15718&JSPsrc=upload%5CLIVESITE%5CRulesProce
dures%5CEthicsStandards%5Ccode.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2003); MODEL STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Arbitration Ass'n et al., 1994), available at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15734&JSPsrc=upload%5CLIVESITE%5CfocusArea%5
Clabor%5C..%5C..%5CResources%5CRoster%5CMediators%5Cstandard.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2003). For a discussion of the relationship of these codes to the ethics codes applicable to lawyers,
see Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to Revise
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption and State Application, 54
ARK. L. REV. 207, 213-17 (2001).
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the prevailing legal ethics regime, usually a version of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,215  which now recognizes both
representational and nonrepresentational roles of lawyers; 216 however,
different rules apply to different roles. With respect to the
representational role, Model Rules 1.1 through 1.17 apply to a lawyer-
client relationship, and Model Rules 3.1 through 3.9 apply when the
lawyer is serving as advocate. With respect to the nonrepresentational
role, Model Rule 2.4 applies when lawyers are serving as neutrals.
Most of the other Model Rules are applicable without regard to the
lawyer's relational status vis-A-vis the client.
At first glance, the lawyer-fact finders on the AAA IFFS panel
occupy a particularly nebulous status. The corporation in crisis hires
the fact finder, but only through the AAA, an organization known for
its neutral services, and from a list provided by the AAA. Once
engaged, the fact finders are expected to act impartially and
independently, 217 much like a neutral mediator or arbitrator, but this
type of fact-finding is not strictly speaking an ADR process. Under the
engagement agreement, the fact finder is "legal counsel" to the
"client"; however, the description of the lawyer's role in providing the
service is expressly "not one of advocacy" but is rather one of
independent investigation. Although this role is somewhat atypical for
an organization that otherwise provides only neutral ADR services,
the role of the lawyer-fact finder under the IFFS model is
representational, forming an attorney-client relationship. 218
The AAA's choice of the representational role would seem
counterproductive because the public could easily perceive the fact
finder to be merely a hired gun of a corporation already under public
suspicion, but this is no ordinary attorney-client relationship. To
provide the independence necessary for public trust in the process, the
role is severely restricted through procedures and conditions for
215. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (as amended 2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. Most
states have adopted a version of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, although some
still impose a version of the older ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. California has
developed its own set of professional standards. See UCLA SCH. OF LAW, RESEARCH GUIDE
SERIES, CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS 1, at http://wwwl.law.ucla.edul-ibrary/researchtools/-
guides/guidec5.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
216. See MODEL RULES, supra note 215, at 1.
217. IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 7.1 ("By engaging the Fact-Finder and
participating in IFFS, the Client has agreed that a totally independent and impartial
investigation is in its best interests."). We note that lawyers are supposed to exercise
independent professional judgment, but the concept is different.
218. The lawyer-fact finder can attempt to avoid the formation of an attorney-client
relationship. See id. at 7.2 ("At the sole discretion of the Fact-Finder, the Client and the Fact-
Finder may agree to establish an attorney-client relationship."). This relationship, however, may
be implied as discussed infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
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engagement that turn the typical attorney-client relationship on its
head while staying within the legal ethics rules. The client 219 does not
have the freedom of choice of counsel. It can only select a lawyer
prequalified by the AAA and cannot terminate the relationship at will
without consequence. 220 The client's objective, through the scope of the
engagement, is strictly limited,221 and the client has no control over
the way in which the fact finder pursues the objective. 222 The lawyer-
fact finder controls most aspects of the engagement, 223 has no
obligation to bring matters to the client's attention,224 has limited
duties of confidentiality, 225 and expressly reserves the right make a
noisy withdrawal even if it damages the client.
226
In general, the representational role has distinct advantages
for the process. If an attorney-client relationship is formed, the fact
finder's notes, certain communications between client and fact finder,
and other information gained in the course of the representation are
protected by the work-product doctrine, the attorney-client privilege,
219. IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 1.4 (" '[C]lient' shall mean the party or parties
engaging the fact-finder"). In the context of a corporation composed of various constituencies, it is
important to understand the nature of the "client." See MODEL RULES R. 1.13.
220. Contra MODEL RULES R. 1.16, R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (terminating representation and discussing
the client surrendering the right to terminate services).
221. See id. at R. 1.2(c) (providing that the lawyer may limit scope only if reasonable and if
the client gives informed consent); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 19 (2000) (limiting the scope of representation).
222. Contra MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a) (requiring that the lawyer must consult with client
pursuant to Rule 1.4(a)(2) to carry out objectives).
223. Id.
224. Compare MODEL RULES R. 1.4 (promoting communication with the client to keep client
reasonably informed), with FACT FINDER ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 202 (providing,
in the context of the limited scope of the service: "Fact-Finder shall not be obligated or expected
to bring to the Client's attention any matters of which Fact-Finder or its agents become aware
which are not related to the Report to be rendered in connection with the Engagement.").
225. Compare IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 10.3 (requiring confidentiality to be
governed by an agreement between the client and the fact finder), with MODEL RULES R. 1.6
(making information acquired in the course of the representation confidential with few
exceptions).
226. See MODEL RULES R. 1.16(d) (protecting the client's interests upon withdrawal); id. at R.
1.16 cmt. 8 (terminating representation if client refuses to abide by the agreement); id. at R. 1.6
(addressing disclosure of confidential information necessary to carry out representation).
Corporate lawyers are not permitted to disclose corporate wrongdoing either to the public or to
shareholders when the lawyer's purpose is protecting the corporation itself. See id. at R. 1.13(b),
(c) (providing that if the board of directors refuses to act, the lawyer may resign and that
disclosure outside the corporation is warranted only when permitted by Rule 1.6, which provides
exceptions to confidentiality regardless of the client's consent). Rather, the corporate lawyer is
permitted to refer the matter only to a "higher authority in the organization," including "referral
to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable
law." Id. at R. 1.13(b)(3).
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and the lawyer's duty of confidentiality. 227 From our experience,
corporate decisionmakers are increasingly concerned with the costs
and liability of litigation and would be reluctant to engage in the fact-
finding process, much less to share information, without some
guarantees of confidentiality. 228 Also, employees need to feel that they
can speak in confidence. To the extent confidentiality improves the
thoroughness of the investigation by helping the fact finder gain
access to information that otherwise would not be shared, it improves
227. The attorney-client privilege is a common law privilege designed to encourage full and
frank discussion between attorneys and clients for the purpose of enabling better legal advice by
protecting such communications from public disclosure. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, in
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961); see, e.g., Spectrum
Sys. Int'l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 78 N.Y.2d 371, 376 (1991) ("The attorney client privilege...
fosters the open dialogue between lawyer and client that is deemed essential to effective
representation.") (citations omitted). The work-product doctrine protects certain documents
prepared in anticipation of trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947) (formulating the privilege). With certain limited exceptions, attorneys are required under
their applicable standards of professional conduct to keep information obtained in the course of
representation confidential. See MODEL RULES R. 1.6. The seminal decision on privilege in the
context of internal investigations is Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In that
case, Upjohn's management had sent confidential questionnaires to its employees regarding
potential wrongdoing by corporate personnel, while in-house counsel prepared memoranda and
notes of interviews. Id. at 386-88. The Court held that both the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine apply to internal investigative activities. Id. at 347, 400. The Court
articulated several factors reinforcing a claim of privilege in connection with employee
interviews, including that communications were made by employees to counsel and that the
communications were made at the direction of management so that the company could obtain
legal advice from counsel. Id. at 391-92. This ruling implies that lawyer-fact finders hired with
the expectation of providing legal advice are necessary for these privileges to apply in the SCA
fact-finding context; however, it may be that lawyer- and nonlawyer-fact finders could ensure
confidentiality by working with corporate counsel. A complete discussion of the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine and their application in the context of internal
investigations is beyond the scope of this Article. For a more comprehensive discussion, see
Joseph T. McLaughlin & J. Kevin McCarthy, Corporate Internal Investigations-Legal Privileges
and Ethical Issues in the Employment Law Context, SF42 ALI/ABA 927 (2001). Regarding
privileges in internal investigations generally, see also DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE
INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 6-7 (2000); JEROME G. SNIDER & HOWARD A. ELLINS, CORPORATE
PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION (2002). See infra note 223 and accompanying text
for discussion of self-critical evaluation privilege.
228. There are limits to the protections afforded the attorney-client privilege, work-product
doctrine, and ethical duty of confidentiality. In the course of an internal investigation, certain
communications and work product may not be protected. See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396-97,
401. Because it is an evidentiary privilege, the attorney-client privilege can only be asserted in
the context of a judicial proceeding. Communications during an investigation may not be covered
by the attorney-client privilege because they were not made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice. See Spectrum Sys., 78 N.Y.3d at 371. Notes and other materials generated during the
process may not be covered by the work-product doctrine because there was no pending
litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(3); see also U.S. v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir.
1998) (covers documents generated because of prospect of litigation).
Although nonlawyer-fact finders voluntarily can adhere to a promise of confidentiality, they
are not bound to do so under an enforceable disciplinary regime like lawyers, and there is not a
legally recognized privilege or protection of their client's communications with them.
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the process and the accuracy, of the report.229 Additionally, other
confidential matters such as trade secrets may be involved. The
attorney-client relationship is a double-edged sword, however. While it
provides some important advantages, it imposes duties of loyalty and
confidentiality that can be perceived by a suspicious public and
depicted by adversarial interest groups as a convenient pretext for
hiding important facts from the public and insulating the company
from liability exposure. Despite claims that the attorney-client
relationship actually should give the process more credibility, its
existence has the potential to undermine the public trust in the
process. The AAA's procedural/contractual restraints on the
representational role do not address this concern directly. Instead, the
belief is that if someone with integrity conducts a high-quality,
independent process under the AAA's procedures and supervision, it
will engender public trust in the process.
Consistent with its experience and reputation in providing
neutral services, the AAA could have selected a nonrepresentational
role, under which the company engages the lawyer as a neutral rather
than as legal counsel, thereby avoiding the formation of an attorney-
client relationship. 230 The Model Rules now recognize the neutral role,
when the lawyer is acting as a third party to resolve a dispute or other
matter between two or more parties, as an aspect of practicing law. 231
A lawyer-neutral does not have an attorney-client relationship with
the parties,232  and the source of payment is irrelevant. 233
Unfortunately, the Model Rules did not anticipate SCA-fact-finding in
corporate crises in which there are no clearly designated additional
parties involved as disputants in the process-thereby making the
lawyer-neutral a third party.
229. The fact finder (whether a lawyer or not) may employ a law firm on behalf of the
corporation to assist in the process, in which case the firm could have an attorney-client
relationship with the corporation.
230. The AAA is not wedded to an attorney-client relationship. See IFFS Procedures, supra
note 197, at 7.2 (stating the attorney-client relationship is at the discretion of the fact finder).
The organization has appointed a nonlawyer to its IFFS panel. See infra note 237. Presumably,
the nonlawyer-fact finder would have an principal-agent relationship with the corporation and
its attendant duties (competence, diligence, and confidentiality, perhaps).
231. See MODEL RULES, preamble.
232. See id. (describing a lawyer-neutral as having a "non-representational role"); id. at R.
2.4(a) (describing a lawyer-neutral as responsible for assisting "persons who are not clients").
233. Although the ideal is that all disputants bear equal responsibility for the neutral's fees
in order to avoid any appearance of bias, it is common practice for one party to pay all the
neutral's fees when the dispute resolution agreement so provides. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION
ASS'N COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, R. 45(c). See generally, DOUGLAS H.
YARN, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN GEORGIA §§ 6-12, 6-14,
8-48 (2d ed. 1997) (describing payment arrangements for mediators and arbitrators).
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Without clearly falling within the definition of the neutral role
as recognized by the Model Rules, lawyer-fact finders may find it
difficult to avoid forming an attorney-client relationship when
engaged to conduct the process. The crucial question is one of contract
since the law of contract governs when an attorney-client relationship
is formed. 234 Is the client voluntarily requesting and the lawyer
consenting to providing a legal service ordinarily provided by a lawyer
to a client? On its face, the service is nonlegal in nature. An
investigation and report does not necessarily constitute the "practice
of law,"235 and it can be conducted by nonlawyers. 236 In fact, the AAA
intends to add nonlawyers to the IFFS panel. 237 But if a lawyer-fact
finder was contracted to determine the lawfulness of any wrongful act
or of any recommended course of conduct or if the use of such legal
expertise was anticipated in the engagement, the engagement would
seem to anticipate that the lawyer-fact finder was engaged for his
legal expertise and that at least that portion of the fact-finding process
constituted the practice of law. 238 Even if the advice is nonlegal in
234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 22, § 14 cmt. a
("Agency and contract law are also applicable [to determining the scope of the attorney-client
relationship], except when inconsistent with special rules applicable to lawyers.").
235. There is no agreement on a comprehensive definition of what constitutes the practice of
law. Most states have statutes on the unauthorized practice of law that list certain activities.
Generally, it is agreed that such practice includes the representation of another person in
litigation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000) (noting
that certain activities, such as the representation of another person in litigation, are generally
proscribed). The drafting of legal instruments is also generally considered to constitute the
practice of law, except perhaps where incidental to another specialized occupation, particularly
when the preparation involves the filling in of blanks in a standard form. Cf. id. (noting that
activities like completing standard forms are controversial, which means that scholars and
courts debate whether this action should be considered the practice of law). There are various
tests used to determine what constitutes the practice of law, including the professional judgment
test, the traditional areas of law practice test, and the incidental legal services test. See
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.1.3 (1986).
236. Examples of nonlawyer-fact finders include Andrew Young, Lynn Martin, and Paul
Volcker. See supra notes 160-80 and accompanying text.
237. As we write this article, the AAA added the first nonlawyer to the IFFS panel, Edward
T. Reilly, President and CEO, American Management Association. Nonlawyers would not have
an attorney-client relationship but rather a principal-agent relationship and its attendant duties
as determined by the contractual relationship.
238. Such advice involves an activity "in which a lawyer's presumed special training and
skills are relevant," an activity that is something lawyers commonly do, and an activity that is
not "simply an adjunct to a routine in the business or commercial world that is not itself law
practice." WOLFRAM, supra note 235.
The same debate rages over when and whether lawyer-mediators are engaged in the practice
of law. See ASS'N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, REPORT OF THE COMM. TO STUDY THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 9-31 (2002) (defining mediation and discussing the activities
conducted by mediators that (1) should not be considered the practice of law; (2) should be
considered the practices of law; and (3) may be considered the practice of law).
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nature, the lawyer-fact finder may still be engaged in the practice of
law considering the broad definition of advice allowed in Model Rule
2.1.239
From a functional perspective, a characterization of the
lawyer-fact finder's role may rest upon the extent to which the
lawyer-fact finder participated in the formulation and execution of
legal strategies. For example, if the lawyer-fact finder advises the
company on how best to use the investigation and report in the
context of anticipated litigation or regulatory action, he would seem to
be engaged not only in the practice of law but also in partisan
advocacy. 240 The determinate questions might be framed as whether
the fact finder is acting more as a lawyer than as an investigator and
whether acting even just a smidge as a lawyer is enough to trigger a
complete characterization of the role. Finally, even if the lawyer-fact
finder limited himself solely to an objective investigation and report,
an attorney-client relationship still might be inferred if the client
believed it existed.241
Just as the law of contract determines the existence of the
attorney-client relationship, it would seem possible to avoid the
relationship by a contract in which the lawyer dispels any expectation
of such relationship giving the client no reasonable expectation of the
protections of that relationship. Ostensibly, the AAA's IFFS
engagement agreement attempts to do that to some degree. Despite
any such agreement, any actions or statements by the lawyer-fact
239. See MODEL RULES R. 2.1 ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to
the client's situation.").
240. An analogy can be drawn between the lawyer-fact finder and the lawyer hired as a
nontestifying expert consultant who is subject to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997) (distinguishing
between the testifying expert, one who is not subject to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and a nontestifying expert consultant, one who is subject to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct). The roles of testifying and nontestifying experts are not exclusive-for example, a
lawyer expert might be hired to testify but might also participate substantially in trial strategy.
Id. ("The distinction between the role of the testifying expert and the role of the expert
consultant can, of course, become blurred in actual practice."). Conversely, a nontestifying expert
may be drawn into testifying (raising a number of problems of confidentiality and attorney client
privilege). See id. Similarly, the lawyer-fact finder may be hired with the expectation that she
might also testify in some subsequent forum. Cf. Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Role and
Responsibilities of a Lawyer-Ethicist: The Case of the Independent Counsel's Independent
Counsel, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 776-93 (1999) (using the dichotomy between the testifying
lawyer-expert and the nontestifying expert consultant to examine Sam Dash's role as an ethics
expert for Ken Starr); Samuel Dash, The Ethical Role and Responsibilities of a Lawyer-Ethicist
Revisited: The Case of the Independent Counsel's Neutral Expert Consultant, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1065, 1069-71 (2000) (responding to Professor Moore's article and arguing that the dichotomy
between a testifying lawyer-expert and a nontestifying expert consultant should not be used to
determine whether the lawyer at issue owes duties to the consulted entity).
241. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 221, § 26.
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finder might give rise to the relationship if they blur the distinction
and give the client an impression that the relationship exists.242 There
is also the question as to whether such an agreement would be viewed
as an attempt at exculpation. In short, the attorney-client
relationship may be difficult to avoid, making the AAA's limited
engagement agreement the best possible alternative to a pure
representative model.2
43
Under the AAA's IFFS, the lawyer-fact finder's role is most
closely analogous to that of the lawyer as evaluator addressed by
Model Rule 2.3244 and the corresponding Restatement section. 245 It is
similar to the extent that the client is hiring the lawyer to "evaluate a
matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the
client, ' 246 and that "[iun furtherance of the objectives of a client in the
representation, a lawyer may provide to a non-client the results of the
lawyer's investigation. . . ."247 In PIFF, the public is ultimately the
third party for whom the report is created and who will rely on the
report in determining the corporation's social legitimacy and whether
to extend the public trust. In this sense, the fact finder has a duty to
the public to exercise care and not make false statements.
248
242. See id. § 26 (2000); see also Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977)
('The relationship is created when (1) a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, (2)
the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney's professional
competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives the
desired advice or assistance.").
243. "Pure" means that all duties and responsibilities of representation apply without
modification.
244. See MODEL RULES R. 2.3. Rule 2.3, entitled "Evaluation for Use by Third Persons,"
provides:
(a) A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of
someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the
evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the
client.
(b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to
affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the
evaluation unless the client gives informed consent.
(c) Except as disclosure is authorized in connection with a report of an evaluation,
information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
Id.
245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 221, § 95.
246. MODEL RULES R. 2.3(a).
247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 221, § 95(1).
248. See id. §§ 95(3), 51; MODEL RULES R. 4.1 ("In the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person;
or (b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client.").
Model Rule 2.3 implies that the evaluating lawyer already represents the client and is thus
responsible for determining that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the
lawyer's relationship with the client and obtaining the client's informed consent before revealing
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Although the AAA's restricted representational model and the
responsibilities imposed on the lawyer-fact finder/evaluator should
assuage the public's initial natural wariness of the representational
approach, such details are arcane and likely to be ignored in the heat
of a media feeding frenzy. No matter what the conditions of the
engagement, critics can always question the process by raising the fact
that the public independent fact finder was hired to represent the
beleaguered corporation. It is easy to overlook the AAA's role as a
buffer between the fact finder and the corporation during the selection
and contracting phases. 249 The only way to avoid this vulnerability
completely is to adopt a nonrepresentational role model at the expense
of the process advantages from the confidentiality of an attorney-client
relationship.
Assuming that the corporation pays for the fact finder's
services,250 there are a couple of possible nonrepresentational role
models from which to choose. One such model is that of the
independent public accountant as auditor of a publicly traded
company. Although this trust-generating institution is under some fire
because of accountants' involvement in the current accounting
scandals,251 it is similar in its need for independence and its
orientation toward the public's interest. 252 Investors must be able to
rely upon the financial statements of publicly traded companies, and
the auditor's opinion provides crucial assurance that the financial
statements have been subjected to a rigorous examination by an
objective, impartial, and skilled professional. Investors rely upon
independent auditors, and if investors do not believe the auditor is
potentially damaging information. See MODEL RULES R. 2.3(A) ("A lawyer may provide an
evaluation of a matter affecting a client ... if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the
evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client."). Under
the AAA's IFFS, the lawyer-fact finder does not provide these legal services contemplated by the
Model Rule. Because the client has already agreed that the independent fact-finding process is in
its best interest, the fact finder is not responsible for deciding whether it is in the corporation's
best interest neither to issue the report nor to obtain the client's informed consent before
disclosing potentially damaging information.
249. The AAA's role here should not be interpreted as soliciting for lawyers or engaging in
fee splitting.
250. The process could be institutionalized so that the fact finder is paid by someone other
than the corporation. For example, the government, a self-regulatory organization, or a trade
association could provide the fact-finding service.
251. Even prior to the Enron scandal, regulators were reconsidering what it means to be a
"independent" auditor. See Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2002)
(establishing a "nonexclusive" list of circumstances in which accountants cannot be considered
independent).
252. The accounting profession's principles of professional conduct state that "[m]embers
should accept the obligation to act in the way that will serve the public interest, honor the public
trust, and demonstrate commitment to the profession." AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ET § 53.
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independent of the company, they will be far less likely to invest in a
company's securities. The parallels are plain; however, unlike an
independent auditor, the public independent fact finder should have
no interest in repeat business.
Another nonrepresentational role model is that of the trustee.
Instead of principal-agent and attorney-client, the relationship could
be framed as a settlor-trustee-beneficiary relationship. In many ways,
the relationship created by the AAA's model is consistent with a
trustee model and inconsistent with the legal paradigm of agency. In
agency, the principal hires the agent to act for him, can direct the
agent's activities, and can fire the agent at any time, or if the contract
forbids firing at any time, the principal can simply terminate the
agent's status by removing the authority delegated to the agent.253
Under the AAA's model, the independent fact finder is acting on
behalf of the corporation, but not under its orders.25 4 The corporation
cannot freely hire or fire the fact finder, who is still obligated to report
even if the corporation attempts to end the engagement. 255
Agency law may be contrasted with a trust arrangement, in
which the trustee is not the agent of the settlor but rather an
independent party who is committed to act for the best interest of the
beneficiaries. 256 Once the trust is created, the settlor relinquishes
control over the trust property and the management of it.257 The
beneficiaries do not have control over the property while it is in the
trust, and they therefore cannot direct the trustee's actions. 258 The
253. See, e.g., Eric B. Rasmusen, A Theory of Trustees, and Other Thoughts (social science
abstracts, Nov. 17, 1997) (noting that the hiring party, the principle, "can fire the agency at any
time unless they have a contract that forbids it, and even if the contract requires him to keep
paying the agent, he [the principal] can end the status.., by removing all the authority
delegated to the agent."), at
pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/published/89.book.trustees.new.pdf (last visited, Apr. 6, 2003).
254. IFFS PROCEDURES, supra note 197, at 7.3.
255. Id. at 8.2 & 8.3.
256. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 170; GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 341 (6th student
ed. 1987) ("The trustee owes a duty to the beneficiaries to administer the affairs of the trust
solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.").
257. The settlor relinquishes control over the trust property if the trust is irrevocable-that
is, if the trust cannot be modified or terminated. BOGERT, supra note 256, at 528. Suppose a
settlor transfers a sum of money to an irrevocable trust (that is, one that cannot be modified or
revoked). The settlor can give directions in the initial trust agreement (e.g., invest the money
conservatively and distribute to the beneficiaries in five years), but, once the property is
transferred to the trustee, the settlor has relinquished control of both the property and the
process. That is, the settlor cannot come back the next year and try to retrieve the property, nor
can the settlor change the beneficiaries or the investment instructions.
258. Using the example described supra note 257, the beneficiaries may not demand a
change in investments or an early distribution. On the other hand, they do have a cause of action




trustee is bound to effectuate the terms of the trust and to act with
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries at all times. 259 Similarly, a
company in crisis (the settlor) is committed to the fact-finding process
once the fact finder (trustee) has been engaged. The company no
longer has control over the product of the process, and the fact finder,
as an independent actor, is bound to complete the assignment
regardless of the company's wishes. The general public (the
beneficiaries) also has no direct control over the process, but the fact
finder is duty-bound to act only for the public's benefit. Just as
politicians, government institutions, and independent bankers are
public trustees, 260 the public independent fact finder under this model
is a public trustee.
The nonrepresentational role model is attractive primarily
because it is immune to the suspicion and innuendo that surround the
representational model. By avoiding representation, the fact finder
avoids public suspicion of the process, promotes acceptance of the
report, and reinforces the company's apologia. The AAA has sought to
achieve these advantages of nonrepresentational role models by
making the IFFS model functionally approximate the public trustee
model. The procedural and contractual restraints on the duties an
attorney would normally owe a client create a situation in which the
client has given complete control over to the lawyer-fact finder in
much the same way as a settlor gives control to a trustee. In addition,
the rules of engagement under the IFFS substantially reduce the
distinction between representational and nonrepresentational models.
By committing to finding the truth by giving free rein to the fact
finder and by releasing the fact finder from most other duties, the
client is essentially saying that the fact finder's only job is to find and
expose the truth and that in doing so the fact finder is representing
our interests.
VII. RECONCILING COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS THROUGH A FACT-
FINDING PRIVILEGE
Even though the distinction between representational and
nonrepresentational models is blurred somewhat in the IFFS, it is a
representational model nonetheless and risks public suspicion.
Ultimately, the AAA determined that in spite of such a risk a
259. The trustee cannot use trust assets for personal benefit nor can the trustee use the trust
assets imprudently. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, §§ 170, 227.
260. See Rasmusen, supra note 253, at 5-6. "All government, of right, originates with the
people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole. Public
officers are the trustees and servants of the people and are at all times amenable to them." See
GA. CONST. Art. I, § 2, T 1.
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representational model was the only way to provide corporate
decisionmakers with the confidentiality necessary to encourage them
to use the process. When considering the use of PIFF in an overall
strategy of responding to a social legitimacy crisis, corporate
decisionmakers are attempting to reconcile competing
considerations-public perception and legal exposure. 261 Typically, the
corporation's public relations staff advocates an open strategy in
which the corporation discloses all information to promote its image as
being forthcoming about its faults and, therefore, trustworthy and
deserving of social legitimacy. 262 In contrast, corporate counsel
advocates a closed strategy, admitting nothing and revealing as little
as possible.263 Lawyers instinctively fear that the corporation or its
employees may say or do something that will disadvantage it in
current or future litigation.264
Although some legally recognized confidentiality arrangement
that assuages litigation fears may be necessary to induce an
organization in crisis to use PIFF, most crisis management experts
would agree that the loss of a few million dollars from lawsuits pales
in comparison to the loss of shareholder value when that corporation
loses the public trust.265 When the organization's very existence is on
the line, attempts to hide anything seem misdirected. In an article
prior to the Enron revelations and his service as SEC Chairman,
Harvey Pitt observed: "If a crisis actually arises, full disclosure and
total candor (rather than a stonewalling or 'limited hang-out'
approach) should be the order of the day."266 Nevertheless, the same
experts recognize a balance between enough disclosure to reassure the
public and a reasonable modicum of confidentiality to minimize legal
exposure. 267
261. See Carol Basri & Irving Kagan, Crisis Management, in PRACTICING LAW INST.,
ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP 599-600 (2002) ("The corporation's disclosure
strategy is a function of balancing these two considerations. First, the corporation has a strong
interest in maintaining its image; . . the other input is legal liability.").
262. Id. at 600.
263. See id.
264. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 110, at 967 (noting that many articles on crisis
management warn companies to "rein in your lawyers" to save the company) (citation omitted).
265. See Basri & Kagan, supra note 261, at 599 ('The avoidance of $1 million in a civil suit is
not worth the loss of $20 million in profits from lost sales.").
266. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 110, at 965 ("The key to public confidence and
acceptance, however, is candor and complete disclosure.').
267. See Basri & Kagan, supra note 261, at 600 (considering "the best strategy" to be one
between "complete non-disclosure" and "full disclosure"); Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 110,
at 967 (recognizing that the future survival of the company depends on revealing some
information to retain corporate credibility while keeping some information confidential to avoid
additional legal liability),
2003] 1171
1172 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 56:1113
Currently, PIFF's ability to strike this balance and provide
some assurance of confidentiality relies upon the fact finder and the
corporation having an attorney-client relationship through which the
corporation can assert the protections of the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine. In contrast, a nonrepresentational
approach cannot achieve this balance unless an evidentiary privilege
for fact-finding exists independently of the attorney-client
relationship. Already, some jurisdictions have recognized a self-critical
analysis or a self-evaluative privilege, under which an organization's
internal reports and critical assessments remain confidential if all
parties involved expected that the information would remain
confidential.
268
In general, evidentiary privileges are created when public
policy favors confidential relationships that are not effective absent
protected communications. 269  The rationale underlying a self-
evaluative privilege is that it encourages full and frank discussions
that allow organizations to assess their operations critically and to
improve and to correct their conduct and practices. 270 Corporations
and their employees will be resistant to a nonrepresentational
approach and nonlawyer-fact finders (and possibly lawyer-fact
finders) because they fear that without confidentiality protections the
information uncovered may be used against them. This resistance
makes it difficult for the fact finder to gather critical information
268. The privilege was first recognized in Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249
(D.C. Cir. 1970). Where courts have accepted the self-evaluative privilege, they prescribe four
elements in order for it to apply in a particular situation:
[Tlhe information must result from a critical self analysis by the party asserting the
privilege; second, the public must have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of
the type of information sought; . . . [third,] the information must be of the type whose
flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed; ... [and fourth,] no document will
be accorded a privilege unless it was prepared with the expectation that it would be
kept confidential, and has in fact been kept confidential.
Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Note, The
Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983)). A complete discussion of
the privilege is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis, supra (discussing the extent to which self-evaluations conducted by either institutions
or individuals are privileged).
269. See WIGMORE, supra note 227, § 2285. According to Wigmore,
(1) the communications must originate in a confidence so that they will not be
disclosed to others; (2) the element of confidentiality must be essential to the ...
maintenance between the parties; (3) the relation must be one which the opinion of
the community ought to be fostered and protected; (4) the injury [from disclosure] ...
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained by the public for the correct disposal
of litigation.
Id.
270. See In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that the
privilege is intended to serve the "[p]ublic interest by encouraging self-improvement through
uninhibited self-analysis and evaluation").
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when the threat of disclosure may discourage individuals from coming
forward with that information. In forms of fact-finding in which the
final report is not meant for public disclosure, the fact finder may
actually be discouraged from investigating thoroughly, fearing that if
the report were disclosed, he would be subject to criticism or liability.
Although the report in PIFF is meant to be public, the corporation
may still have a strong interest in protecting some of the information
uncovered by the fact finder but not revealed in the report. In
jurisdictions recognizing the self-critical analysis privilege, some
protections could apply to the communications and work products
underlying the final public report and generated as part of the fact-
finding process.
271
Moreover, a self-evaluation privilege may be a significant
improvement over the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
doctrine. In the corporate context, the attorney-client privilege
extends to communications between employees and the corporate
attorney only if the elements articulated by the Supreme Court in
Upjohn are present. 272 It is easy to find the elements wanting in the
context of a fact-finding process. For example, protected
communications are those made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice; however, the investigation and therefore the related
communications in a fact-finding process, particularly in a PIFF, are
not made for the purpose of receiving legal advice but rather for the
purpose of responding to a corporate legitimacy crisis and regaining
the public trust. The communication must be made to the
organization's attorney; however, the fact finder, even if a lawyer,
might not be considered an attorney for the purposes of the attorney-
client privilege because she is not giving legal advice. Because only
confidential communications are covered, facts learned that are not
part of the communications and of the fact finder's evaluation made in
the course of the process are not protected. Finally, it is easy for the
organization's employees who fail to understand how strictly the
privilege is applied to waive it unintentionally.
271. See, e.g., Laws v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 824, 825-26 (D.D.C. 1987)
(holding that the privilege covered a private memorandum prepared by a doctor, who was
accused of malpractice and who delivered the memorandum to the chairman of his department in
order to prompt a review that ultimately occurred at a staff meeting).
272. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981). The elements include: (a) the
communication is made under instructions of corporate superiors to secure legal advice; (b) the
issues communicated must be those within the scope of the employee's duties; (c) the employee
must be cognizant that the communications are for the purpose of obtaining legal advice for the
corporation; and (d) corporate superiors must direct that the communications remain
confidential, and (e) the communications must not actually be disclosed to anyone outside the
attorney client relationship. See id.
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Likewise, the work-product doctrine is limited in its protection
to the product of an attorney's trial preparation. 273 Although the
doctrine holds some promise for protecting the records of interviews,
employee statements, and other materials prepared or gathered in
connection with the fact-finding process, it is also easily waived, and
the materials are discoverable if the opposing party can show a
"substantial need" for the information. 274 Moreover, the materials
must be prepared in anticipation of litigation. 275 Although most
organizations suffering from a corporate social legitimacy crisis
anticipate related litigation, the work-product doctrine may not apply
if preparation for that litigation was not the dominant purpose of the
fact-finding.
Considering the possible gaps in confidentiality under the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, a self-
evaluation privilege would not only provide some protection in a
nonrepresentational model of IFF but arguably also would provide
more protection in the representational model. Unfortunately, the
self-evaluation privilege is poorly established 276 and has been the
subject of criticism. 277 Legislation that uniformly recognizes and
clarifies the application of a self-critical analysis privilege would
encourage the use of PIFF and other forms of SCA fact-finding and
give organizations more confidence in nonrepresentational as well as
representational institutionalization approaches. 278
Although not as directly applicable as the self-evaluation
privilege, the confidentiality accorded to mediation proceedings bears
some consideration as analogous. Confidentiality has long been
recognized as necessary to the success of mediation, 279 and mediation
273. See supra note 227 (discussing the recognition of the doctrine).
274. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
275. See id.; see also United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that the work-product doctrine covers documents generated because of the prospect of litigation).
276. The Supreme Court has not recognized the privilege, and those courts which have given
it limited acceptance have applied it inconsistently and narrowly. See Jason M. Healy et al.,
Confidentiality of Health Care Provider Quality of Care Information, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 595, 630
nn.165-68 (2002).
277. See James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 551, 569-70 (1983) (asserting that the absence or presence of such a privilege
"would not have a significant impact on the investigation or on the behavior of those involved").
278. See Healy et al., supra note 276, at 647-57 (proposing a comprehensive federal statute
creating a privilege for health care records generated to improve the quality of care); David P.
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. 113, 116-22 (1988)
(describing generally the need for a privilege protecting self-critical analysis).
279. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 37, 37-39 (1986) (noting the importance of
confidentiality to effective mediation); Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent:
Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. L.
REV. 315, 323-27 (1989) (discussing the need for confidentiality in mediation); Alan Kirtley, The
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privileges have been established by statutes and court rules. 280 As
stated in the recently approved Uniform Mediation Act, the purpose of
the privilege is to "promote candor of parties through confidentiality of
the mediation process, subject only to the need for disclosure to
accommodate specific and compelling societal interests."281 Similar to
mediation, the candor possible only under the protection of
confidentiality is necessary for the success of the IFF process. Just as
confidence in the impartiality of the process and the mediator is
enhanced by the mediation privilege, so too would confidence be
enhanced in IFF and in the fact finder. 28 2 While mediation serves an
important public purpose by facilitating the resolution of disputants'
problems, IFF serves the important public purpose of helping
organizations to determine what, if any, problems they have, resolve
those problems, and prevent their recurrence. In addition, to the
extent that PIFF achieves the important public purpose of
reestablishing social legitimacy, public trust, and the benefits of
cooperative relationships, the process seems as deserving of
confidentiality protections as mediation.
Mediation Privilege's Transformation from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation
Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 8-10 (discussing the function of confidentiality in mediation); Ellen E. Deason,
The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial
Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 80-84 (2001) (discussing the need for confidentiality in
mediation). But see, e.g., Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 31-35 (1986) (concluding that a mediation privilege cannot "be justified under
traditional privilege analysis"); Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go
the Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 72-77 (2001) (noting that confidentiality will at some level
conflict with the primary purpose of mediation, self-determination).
280. See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE app. B (2d ed. Supp.
2001) (listing relevant state statutes). To the extent that fact-finding becomes a court-connected
process like some mediation, confidentiality can be conferred by court rule. See, e.g., Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 652 (d) (2000) (empowering federal courts to develop
confidentiality rules for mediation); GA. ALTERNATIVE DIsP. RES. R. VII (providing an evidentiary
exception for statements made and documents created in the context of a mediation and for the
protection of mediators from subpoena).
281. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. LAws, Prefatory Note to UNIF. MEDIATION ACT
(2001).
282. Because the privilege is independent of an attorney-client relationship, it would
promote the less assailable nonrepresentational model. See id.:
[P]ublic confidence in and the voluntary use of mediation can be expected to expand if
people have confidence that the mediator will not take sides or disclose their
statements, particularly in the context of other investigations or judicial processes.
The public confidence rationale has been extended to permit the mediator to object to
testifying, so that the mediator will not be viewed as biased in future mediation
sessions that involve comparable parties.
Id. (citing NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980), and concluding that the public
interest in maintaining the perceived and actual impartiality of mediators outweighs the
benefits derivable from a given mediator's testimony).
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In the absence of a well-established fact-finding privilege based
either on the self-evaluation privilege or on the mediation privilege,
the AAA's representational approach with its attendant limitations
seems to be in that important "middle ground," ostensibly satisfying
the organization's concerns with confidentiality of information while
also putting in motion a process that commits the corporation to
publicly tell the truth, admit fault where necessary, and make
amends. If the attorney-client relationship in the AAA's program
creates some tension between confidentiality and publicness, it should
not be fatal to the institutionalization of the process. As individuals,
Griffin Bell and George Mitchell have successfully used the
representational model and overcome criticism because they have
insisted on full access without interference. 28 3 Ultimately, the
thoroughness and fairness of their reports won the day. Drawing from
their experience, the AAA is pursuing the most functional
institutionalization model. Any lingering public doubts hopefully will
be erased as the process gains additional credibility over time.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Until PIFF is better institutionalized, a small group of elite
lawyers and public figures are crucial to the success of the process.
They are doubtless well aware that their public reputations are on the
line each time they undertake the process. Whatever relational model
is selected, these public independent fact finders owe a special duty to
the public which trusts them. Ultimately, the public's trust in
individuals and entities such as these and the process in which they
engage is a precious commodity for institutions in crises. In turn, their
reputations are a public good. Consequently, such fact finders are
essentially "trustees" of the public trust with corresponding fiduciary
duties, and it is essential for them to conduct these processes so as to
best preserve the public's confidence in their integrity.
We have not explored some of the potentially useful variations
on the fact-finding theme. For example, independent fact-finding can
be used proactively for crisis prevention rather than simply reactively
for crisis response. If an organization senses an emerging problem, it
can use independent fact-finding to determine the facts and fix the
problem before it triggers a legitimacy crisis. If there is no problem, it
has an independent report that documents that finding. Under either
scenario, it can preempt criticism by showing that it was acting
283. It also helps that Bell and Mitchell were unflinchingly critical in their reports when
they discovered problems. Query whether the institutionalization effort would be hampered if
only companies without problems used it or if fact finders were not finding problems.
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responsibly by engaging in self-critical analysis and by having the
facts immediately on hand for public discussion if necessary. It can
manage its apologia based on independently determined facts,
preempt the controversy, and effectively inoculate itself from ongoing
media interest and innuendo. Along these same lines, internal
investigations are often helpful in resolving conflicts within an
organization and, if conducted by an independent committee of a
corporation's board of directors, may reduce criminal penalties 28 4 and
serve as a defense to a shareholder suit or breach of fiduciary duty
claim.
Although business corporations were the focus of this Article,
fact-finding can be effective in other organizational settings as well.
The courts have yet to harness the potential of such a process as an
adjunct to the judicial system. By encouraging joint fact-finding early
in litigation, particularly in complex, fact-intensive cases, the courts
could reduce their dockets and the parties' costs of litigation. When
faced with the time constraints of a temporary restraining order, the
court could encourage joint fact-finding to obtain the necessary facts in
a timely manner. Courts could provide the service on request of an
organization or individual seeking SCA fact-finding and serve as
another institutional delivery system by maintaining a fact finder
panel. In this sense, fact-finding could be another yet another door in
the "multi-door courthouse."28 5
PIFF is not a panacea for this age of corporate illegitimacy and
public mistrust and by no means is it a replacement for other trust-
generating institutions, many of which are undergoing restructuring
in the face of the current crisis; however, PIFF holds some interesting
promise. To the extent that PIFF can help falsely accused
organizations clear their names, can help otherwise good companies
restore their names after the wrongdoing of a few of their
constituents, and can aid in the reformation of good companies gone
bad, it should be used and supported. However, some degree of
institutionalization, with an emphasis on procedures and standards
that preserve the integrity of the process, will best serve its continued
use and development. The AAA's institutionalization effort reflects
some of the tensions in doing so and presents an intriguing
compromise between representational and nonrepresentational fact
finder role models.
284. See supra note 142.
285. The courthouse of many doors was a concept put forth by Frank Sander, whose article
on the idea is credited with the modern alternative dispute resolution movement among legal
institutions. See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
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When the process is better institutionalized, more individuals
can fill the fact finder role. This presents lawyers with a unique
opportunity to serve their immediate communities by participating in
the resolution of the legitimacy crises of local businesses, charities,
governments, and congregations. If it is the dream of justice that the
guilty shall be so found and the innocent vindicated, the great
inefficiencies of the rough justice of poorly informed public opinion
must be addressed. The fact-finding concept has the potential to work
at many societal levels to provide a quick, fair, and objective
intervention to resolve controversy based on rumor and innuendo. In a
global society in which public opinion can change so quickly, fact-
finding can fill a void in dispute-handling processes between the
formal application of law through litigation and the informal shaping
of public opinion.
